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INTRODUCTION 
New technology has made copyright enforcement difficult to 
achieve.1  Technology has made it possible to transmit, reproduce, and 
obtain copyrighted materials around the globe without great monetary 
investment.  The Internet and digital technology allow users from 
different countries to share and obtain music, movies, or other protected 
works without even knowing where the source of the copyrighted 
material is located.  On the other hand, satellite technology brings 
another problem:  foreign users may obtain satellite signals without 
authorization.  As technology becomes more sophisticated and easy to 
use, copyright holders may need the aid of more efficient enforcement 
procedures to be able to stop infringement abroad, including protecting 
themselves even in countries where the activity is not otherwise 
considered an infringement of rights. 
Existing international copyright litigation practices were crafted in 
the analog age.  A new set of problems are now afoot.  Copyright 
holders face an entirely different sort of scenario when, for example, 
they must try to quell infringement in a situation in which the copy is of 
exactly the same quality as the original as opposed to when they just had 
to focus on  impeding the diffusion of low quality copies or subsequent 
transmissions.  In the latter situation, the mere fact that each generation 
of copies lost quality, as compared to the source, served as an essential 
and inherent protection mechanism that now largely no longer exists. 
At the international level, copyright holders are fighting a battle in 
which they hold nothing more than antique guns while they are pitted 
against the most modern and sophisticated artillery.  This does not mean 
that all existing international conventions are useless.2  On the contrary, 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
 
 1. See Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights:  Choice of Law in 
Transnational Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 3 (1999). 
 2. Professor Gervais defines four stages of development of international copyright 
conventions:  the pre-1883 bilateral phase; the 1883–1971 BIRPI phase (so named for the 
Bureaux Internationaux Réunis pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle under which 
the Paris and Berne Conventions were administered); the 1971–1994 TRIPs phase, which 
included the signing of the 1971 Paris Act of the Berne Convention and the negotiation of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; and the now current, 
post-1994 paradigmatic phase in which new technologies have new challenges.  Daniel J. 
Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property:  New Challenges from the Very Old 
and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 929 (2002).  While I 
agree with the designation of those phases, I think that the new challenges are about 
enforcement procedures, rather than traditional knowledge, as Professor Gervais suggests.  
See id. at 933. 
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Rights (TRIPs Agreement) has achieved impressive accomplishments in 
harmonizing and setting minimum rights around the world. 3  In other 
words, in order to enforce copyrights efficiently, only a modest step is 
needed.  There is a need for an international mechanism for the 
enforcement of existing rights.4  Just as it has become easier to infringe 
upon copyrights, it must become easier to enforce copyrights as well.  
This is the impetus for this Article; what follows is a proposal for a 
mechanism for international copyright litigation. 
The proposed mechanism is the next needed development in 
international copyright law.  History has shown that technological 
developments are followed by changes in the copyright law in an 
attempt to solve the new problems technology creates for copyright 
holders.5  But the problems created by recent technological 
developments can not be solved by the decisions of individual countries 
to each expand their copyright protections.  With the Internet, even if 
copyrighted works can be well protected in the home country, those 
same copyrighted materials can be subject to infringement abroad.  As 
technology allows copyrighted materials to be transmitted easily around 
the globe without the authorization of the copyright owner, there is an 
increased need for protection without borders.  This protection needs to 
be not only substantive, but also procedural.  International treaties 
establishing minimum rights and other substantive definitions like those 
 
 3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs 
Agreement]; see Martin D.H. Woodward, TRIPs and NAFTA’s Chapter 17:  How Will Trade-
Related Multilateral Agreements Affect International Copyright?, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 269, 284 
(1996) (recognizing that the TRIPs Agreement found common ground among different 
nations and potentially succeeded in increasing the level of international copyright 
protection). 
 4. While it has been recognized that the TRIPs Agreement has advanced the effort to 
achieve strong worldwide enforcement, “with the continued rapid proliferation of the 
Internet, international enforcement of intellectual property rights will remain a significant 
and increasingly daunting challenge.”  Matthew V. Pietsch, International Copyright 
Infringement and the Internet:  An Analysis of the Existing Means of Enforcement, 24 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 273, 277 (2002).  However, in this Article I suggest that a new 
mechanism for international enforcement of copyrights is the next needed step. 
 5. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude:  Intellectual Property Law, 
1900–2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2000).  The premise of Merges’s article is that “intellectual 
property law has generally adapted quite well to each successive wave of technological 
innovation.”  Id. at 2190.  Merges includes some examples based on U.S. law, including 
movies, radio, television, video recording, software, and piano rolls, and he closes with the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).  Id. at 2192–99. 
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already in force are not the only measures needed.6  A procedural 
mechanism for international litigation would serve to complement 
already existing substantive provisions.  This problem of international 
enforcement is not entirely new, but it is made more critical by 
technological developments. 
It is extremely easy to distribute infringing materials throughout the 
whole world.  Therefore, it is necessary to balance between easy 
infringement and expensive enforcement; it is also important to address 
the uncertainties involved in international litigation.  The risk is not only 
the expense of attorneys’ fees, but also that copyright holders do not 
know if their efforts to enforce copyrights abroad are going to succeed 
or will only be useless wastes of money and time.  No doubt, to some 
extent these uncertainties are common to all lawsuits, but in most other 
contexts there is, at least, a greater amount of precedent for successful 
results.  The more uncertainty there is about the procedures of 
enforcement, applicable laws, or the likely results, the more unwilling 
copyright holders will be to try to enforce their rights abroad. 
The problem for a copyright holder is not only the potential loss of 
earnings due to infringement, but also the additional costs spent in 
unsuccessful litigation.  Also, there is the risk that the procedure could 
be legally successful, but still ineffective at stemming the infringement.  
Success in court by receiving a favorable judgment is only the first step; 
a favorable judgment is made worthwhile through enforcement.  
Enforcing judgments would be easy if all the defendants were residents 
of the country of the court that rendered the judgment.  In the case of 
foreign defendants, it would also be straightforward if they had assets 
within that country.7  However, foreign defendants with no assets in the 
forum country create a problem.  It can be difficult to have national 
judgments enforced in the foreign country where the defendant resides 
or has assets, and it is also difficult, costly, and time consuming to need 
 
 6. During the early stages of implementation of the TRIPs Agreement, Professor 
Hamilton presented an article criticizing the TRIPs Agreement, among other things, because 
it neglected to address that intellectual property environments would soon be online.  See 
Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement:  Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L  L. 613 (1996). 
 7. See Symposium, Copyright’s Long Arm:  Enforcing U.S. Copyrights Abroad, 24 LOY. 
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 45, 47 (2004).  Panelist Rufus Pichler suggested that the first step to 
enforce international intellectual property rights is to know where to bring the lawsuit and to 
have those rights recognized and enforced.  Id.  Or, in the alternative, if the enforcement 
abroad is too cumbersome, one must focus on other potential defendants that may be local.  
Id. at 47–48.  Even with regard to local cases, he stressed the need to check for the place of 
enforcement.  Id. 
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to pursue additional copyright litigation abroad.  Clear rules about the 
enforcement of preliminary injunctions and monetary judgments will 
also diminish the inconvenience of dealing with the unknowns of how 
foreign judges apply their own substantive and procedural laws.  Even if 
the cost of international litigation would only be marginally reduced 
with this enforcement mechanism, the increased certainty and 
probability of success would improve the balance between unfettered 
infringement and expensive enforcement. 
With the advent of the Internet, it is especially necessary to be able 
to have a decision enforced in the home country and abroad.  The 
proposed mechanism is intended to facilitate certainty in the 
enforcement of copyright judgments abroad.  It will also help avoid the 
re-litigation of the same issues abroad and will bring increased certainty 
to the likely results of litigation.  Ultimately, the proposed mechanism is 
intended to resolve some of the existing problems related to 
international copyright litigation that have been aggravated by the 
advent of the digital age.  While the proposed mechanism does not 
pretend to resolve all of these problems—for instance, counterfeiting in 
Latin America—it will help to diminish them. 
This Article proposes three possible paths.  The first path presents a 
basis for a possible convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
interim measures and judgments related to copyright litigation.  
Ultimately, it is not the convention, itself, but rather its component parts 
that have to be considered if countries want to engage in the proposed 
problem-solving.  But should this first and most ambitious path fail, two 
other possibilities for overcoming the problem are provided. 
In order to facilitate this analysis, the Article is divided into six parts.  
Part I considers remedies both from the perspective of the TRIPs 
Agreement and according to several national copyright statutes.  While 
remedies may differ from country to country, they nevertheless tend to 
have strong similarities due to the TRIPs Agreement.  Part II describes 
the problem of the place of infringement and the related rules about 
choice of law.  Part III addresses concerns related to choosing the right 
forum when trying to enforce court decisions, taking into consideration 
legal aspects of jurisdiction and its consequences.  Part IV considers why 
the proposed Hague Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments (Hague Draft Convention) failed and sets forth the ways in 
which similar failure is to be avoided under the proposed mechanism.  
Part V includes an examination and explanation of the proposed 
mechanism and analyzes how it would perform in practice.  And in 
conclusion, Part VI analyzes several issues concerning the consequences 
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of the proposed mechanism and discusses legislative decisions and 
questions of public choice democracy. 
I.  AVAILABLE REMEDIES FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
The TRIPs Agreement was the first multilateral agreement to 
establish a comprehensive set of remedies.  With slight differences, 
remedies available under national copyright statutes contain all the 
provisions contained in the TRIPs Agreement.  Consequently, the 
remedies ordered by a court applying its own copyright law would not 
be completely unfamiliar to other courts.8 
The problem that could arise, however, is the possible clash of some 
of those remedies with a given country’s constitutional principles, 
including, for example, free speech, due process of law, and takings 
clauses, among others.  Arguably, this problem is resolved, at least 
partially, by considering the fact that the remedies most likely issued by 
the forum court are those available in the place where the remedy is 
enforced and are most likely to meet local constitutional tests.  
However, it must be remembered that local statutes are not free from 
constitutional flaws and are subject to constitutional checks as well. 
It is evident that the negotiators of the TRIPs Agreement took into 
consideration the constitutional clauses of different countries, as 
exemplified in Article 46 of the TRIPs Agreement.9  Article 46 
empowers judicial authorities to destroy and dispose of infringing 
materials and the instruments utilized for their creation “unless this 
would be contrary to existing constitutional requirements.”10  The issue 
then is whether this “unless” phrasing is applicable to the entire 
enforcement section of the TRIPs Agreement or only to Article 46.  The 
answer seems to be that it is not applicable to the whole enforcement 
section; otherwise, negotiators would have included this clause in 
 
 8. Professor Ginsburg discusses the existence of a supranational copyright code.  Jane 
C. Ginsburg, International Copyright:  From a “Bundle” of National Copyright Laws to a 
Supranational Code?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 288 (2000).  While she overlooks 
some of the gaps of existing major conventions, she ultimately concludes the following: 
“International copyright” can no longer accurately be described as a “bundle” 
consisting of many separate sticks, each representing a distinct national law, tied 
together by a thin ribbon of Berne Convention supranational norms.  Today’s 
international copyright more closely resembles a giant squid, whose many national 
law tentacles emanate from but depend on a large common body of international 
norms. 
Id. at 289. 
 9. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 46. 
 10. Id. art. 41. 
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Article 41, which contains general obligations.11  Moreover, the phrasing 
of the entire enforcement section seems to be carefully crafted in order 
to meet constitutional requirements of most countries.12  For instance, 
for provisional measures ordered inaudita altera parte, Article 50(4) 
establishes that the affected party shall be given notice with the 
opportunity of reviewing the decision to see whether it is reasonable.13  
Therefore, it may be concluded that possible constitutional issues were 
studied and resolved by the drafters.  Obviously, the phrasing will not 
prevent constitutional actions against it, but at least it may help to 
prevail against them.  In addition, when implementing treaty obligations 
in their internal law, local legislators have an opportunity to adapt those 
obligations to meet the constitutional principles of their respective 
countries. 
This Article is not intended as an exhaustive study of local remedies, 
but merely seeks to examine the remedies available in several 
jurisdictions.  It also is intended to demonstrate that remedies under 
national copyright statutes are, at some point, very similar due to the 
TRIPs Agreement.14  Where differences do arise, they are often limited 
to the degree of requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction or 
in the compensation of damages.  This Article addresses remedies by 
dividing them into three categories:  temporary or preliminary remedies, 
permanent remedies, and monetary remedies. 
The copyright statutes in most countries establish preliminary 
measures in order to stop infringing activities.  These remedies are 
available, for instance, in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and Mexico without even showing if the infringer acted 
intentionally or negligently.  In France, for example, preliminary 
measures include injunctions to stop infringing activities and the 
confiscation of infringing copies.15  Injunctions to stop infringing 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. art. 50(4). 
 14. A key advantage of the TRIPs Agreement is the availability of effective dispute 
settlement procedures among Member States.  See Daniel R. Bereskin, A Comparison of the 
Trademark Provisions of NAFTA and TRIPs, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 4 (1993).  Therefore, 
Member States are more likely to comply with the TRIPs Agreement in order to avoid trade 
sanctions.  Id.; see also Graeme W. Austin,  Valuing “Domestic Self-Determination” in 
International Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155, 1169 (2002) 
(suggesting that the TRIPs Agreement provides mechanisms, including trade sanctions, for 
testing whether particular policy choices comply with international norms). 
 15. 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE ch. FRA § 8[4][a] (Paul 
Edward Geller & Melville B. Nimmer eds., 2005). 
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activities are almost always given by the judge or administrator of the 
respective first instance court.16  In Germany, an injured party may 
obtain a preliminary injunction even if the infringement is imminent and 
has not taken place yet.17  In the United States, 17 U.S.C. § 502 
establishes that courts may grant preliminary injunctions to prevent 
further harmful conduct by defendants.18  These injunctions are to 
remain until the final judgment is rendered.  A plaintiff must prove that 
he or she is likely to prevail in the final decision of the case, that he or 
she will suffer irreparable harm unless the preliminary injunction is 
granted, and that he or she would suffer more harm if the injunction is 
not granted than the defendant would if the injunction is granted.19  On 
the other hand, if the plaintiff clearly proves the infringement, courts 
are likely to presume the irreparable harm.20 
In Mexico, the Instituto Mexicano de la Propiedad Industrial 
(National Industrial Property Institute), an administrative federal 
agency, and the trial courts may order an inspection visit to a given 
premises.  If federal officials find acts of infringement, they can order 
the forfeiture of infringing materials and devices utilized in infringing 
activities.21  Even if these provisions are weak due to the lack of 
injunctive relief to stop infringement without the inspection visit, Article 
228 of the Industrial Property Act makes the TRIPs Agreement 
enforcement provisions self-executing and the infringement can be 
stopped without these inspections by directly invoking the TRIPs 
Agreement provisions.22 
Because most countries’ national statutes contain enforcement 
provisions complying with the enforcement provisions of the TRIPs 
Agreement, it is very likely that a Mexican court will find those 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. 2 id. ch. GER § 8[4][a][i]. 
 18. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2000). 
 19. See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  THE 
LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 195 (2003). 
 20. See id. 
 21. See Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor [L.F.D.A.] [Federal Copyright Act], art. 234, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 24 de Diciembre de 1996 (Mex.) (establishing that the 
Industrial Property Act enforcement provisions apply to copyright infringement); see also 
Ley de la Propiedad Industrial [L.P.I.] [Industrial Property Act], as amended, arts. 203, 207, 
211, 228, Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 27 de Junio de 1991 (Mex.). 
 22. In Mexico, almost all treaty provisions containing private rights and remedies are 
self-executing.  Article 228 of the Industrial Property Act makes all treaty enforcement 
provisions self-executing; this includes, for example, the chapter XVII provisions of NAFTA.  
L.P.I. [Industrial Property Act] art. 228.  Those provisions, however, are similar to the TRIPs 
Agreement enforcement provisions. 
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provisions similar to those available in Mexico.  The process or 
assimilation of the TRIPs Agreement is increased by the particular view 
of the Mexican Supreme Court that international treaties precede 
federal and state law in hierarchy.  The result of this view is that in cases 
of contrary dispositions between federal or state law and an 
international treaty, the latter would prevail.  Consequently, injunctive 
orders issued by foreign courts are not likely to be against Mexican 
public policy. 
Permanent remedies usually are the same in the TRIPs Agreement 
and in national legal systems.  In almost all cases, the preliminary 
injunction becomes permanent if the plaintiff prevails on the merits of 
the case.  In the United States, however, permanent injunctions are not 
always granted if the court determines that future infringements are 
unlikely or if the court determines that the permanent injunction is 
unnecessary.23  Therefore, almost all copyright statutes likely warrant 
the grant of permanent injunctions, although in some cases, such a grant 
is going to be available only if it is necessary. 
While injunctive relief is very similar across diverse legal systems, 
differences arise in the case of monetary recoveries.  As will be explored 
in Part II, the wording of Article 45 of the TRIPs Agreement leaves 
national legislatures with the task of determining the amount of award 
needed to “adequate[ly] compensate for the injury the right holder has 
suffered because of an infringement of his intellectual property right by 
an infringer who knew or had reasonable grounds to know that he was 
engaged in infringing activity.”24  Thus, the capacity to compensate is left 
to national copyright statutes.  Whereas some copyright statutes provide 
for statutory damages as an option for redress, others are less severe 
and leave the right holder with the burden of proving losses or 
enrichment by the defendant. 
In France, for instance, damages are awarded by taking into 
consideration the amount of harm suffered by the plaintiff, equivalent 
to profits made by the infringer, and those profits that the plaintiff 
would have received.25  Those principles are quite similar to common 
law principles.  The difference here, as compared to U.S. copyright law, 
is that French law does not provide for statutory damages.  Moreover, 
 
 23. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 19, at 195–96. 
 24. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 45(1). 
 25. 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. FRA § 
8[4][b]. 
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even if the copyright law of a given country provides for statutory 
damages, the amounts would be different. 
In Germany, damages are available if the infringement is intentional 
or results from negligence.26  The plaintiff may recover profits made by 
the infringer due to the infringement.  However, in practice, damages 
are often calculated taking into account a “license analogy” of an 
equivalent industry or actual fees already received by the plaintiff for 
the same work.27  Section 97(3) of the German Copyright Act allows the 
plaintiff to recover under the German Civil Code doctrines of unjust 
enrichment.28  The plaintiff may then recover under the previously 
explained rules contained in the German Copyright Act and also based 
on the German Civil Code doctrine of unjust enrichment. 
In the United States, there are three types of monetary recovery:  
actual damages, defendant’s profits, and statutory damages.29  According 
to 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), the plaintiff may recover actual damages, 
consisting of the loss of profits or royalties resulting from the infringing 
activity, plus any profit made by the defendant.30  The plaintiff may 
recover both damages and profits because the statute not only intends 
to compensate losses but also seeks to prevent the infringer from 
benefiting from his or her wrongful acts.31  In the alternative, a plaintiff 
may recover statutory damages instead of actual damages and profits.32 
The precondition for obtaining statutory damages is registration 
with the U.S. Copyright Office prior to the infringement, or in the case 
of published works, within three months of publication.33  Because 
international treaties do not require statutory damages, this provision 
does not violate the Berne Convention requisite of non-formalities in 
order to obtain copyright protection.34  If a foreign work is not 
registered, a plaintiff may still initiate an action and recover actual 
damages and profits. However, he or she may not recover statutory 
damages.  The amount awarded is no less than $750 and no more than 
$30,000.35  If the conduct was committed willfully, the amount may be 
 
 26. 2 id. ch. GER § 8[4][a][ii]. 
 27. See id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000). 
 30. Id. § 504(b). 
 31. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 19, at 196. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 90. 
 34. Id. at 90 n.11. 
 35. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). 
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increased to $150,000.36  However, if the defendant proves that he or she 
was not aware or had no reason to believe that his or her conduct was 
an infringement, the amount cannot be more than $200.37  It is quite 
interesting to note that the amount is for the infringement of each work 
no matter how many times the infringement was made. 
In Mexico, Article 216bis of the Mexican Copyright Act establishes 
that consequential damages always have to reach an amount of no less 
than forty percent of the sale price to the public of the infringing 
product or the cost of the service provided.38  If the plaintiff can prove 
that he or she lost more than the statutory forty percent, he or she will 
be entitled to a higher award.  But statutory damages of no less than 
forty percent of the sale price are not enough to deter infringement; 
they leave a margin of sixty percent to the infringer, which is not 
desirable because most infringement takes place in the informal 
economy.  Infringers do not pay taxes or workers’ social benefits, and 
their raw materials are cheap.  In other cases, when the defendant does 
not have profits, a percentage of the sale price will be unsatisfactory, 
and trying to recover actual damages would be even more difficult 
without yielding any better results.  Statutory damages would likely 
serve as a more effective deterrent if they inflicted large financial 
penalties based on the number of infringed works or the number of 
infringing copies instead of being based on a minimum percentage of 
the sale price. 
Finally, attorneys’ fees are contemplated in Article 45(2) of the 
TRIPs Agreement:  “[t]he judicial authorities shall have the authority to 
order the infringer to pay the right holder expenses, which may include 
appropriate attorney’s fees.”39  However, this wording leaves the 
question open as to whether expenses may or may not include 
attorneys’ fees.  This becomes important when national statutes do not 
include attorneys’ fees or subject them to formalities.  According to 17 
U.S.C. § 412, attorneys’ fees are recoverable only if the work is 
registered at the U.S. Copyright Office.40  This precept is applicable to 
both U.S. works and non-U.S. works.41  While it is not the purpose of 
this Article to determine whether this provision violates Article 45(2) of 
 
 36. Id. § 504(c)(2). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor [L.F.D.A.] [Federal Copyright Act], art. 216bis, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 24 de Diciembre de 1996 (Mex.). 
 39. Id. 
 40. 17 U.S.C. § 412. 
 41. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 19, at 90. 
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the TRIPs Agreement or the non-formality provisions of Article 5(2) of 
the Berne Convention, it is important to consider its practical 
implications.  For U.S. works, registration is necessary to commence an 
infringement action, which is not the case for foreign works under the 
Berne Convention or other major copyright agreements.  However, the 
practical recommendation is, of course, to have those works registered 
in the U.S. Copyright Office.  In almost all other countries, attorneys’ 
fees are available to the prevailing plaintiff, even if his or her work is 
not registered. 
II.  PLACE OF INFRINGEMENT AND QUESTIONS OF CHOICE OF LAW 
When there is copyright infringement abroad, there are several steps 
to be taken in order to claim protection overseas.  The first step is to 
locate the country where protection is sought.  Even if this task does not 
represent a problem in principle, the assessment of the place of 
infringement may not be as clear as one might hope.  Moreover, there 
can be several places of infringement according to several national 
statutes. 
Having determined the place of infringement and the country where 
protection is sought, the next step is to look into the national law of the 
protecting country.42  It is necessary to look at both national copyright 
law and the governing treaty provisions.  It is also important to note 
how treaty provisions are to be construed and if the international treaty 
in question is self-executing or if it has an implementing law.  This part 
of the Article will address conflicts of law issues that arise when 
deciding the applicable law to be applied to infringing activities.43 
 
 42. The choice of a particular country’s protection is a conflict of law issue because that 
determination is made based on the applicable law of the possible countries where protection 
can be sought. 
 43. This question should not pose a problem if using traditional rules of choice of law.  
However, one scholar noted as follows: 
 Intellectual property lawyers and intellectual property scholars have on the 
whole had little to say about conflicts matters.  And, reciprocating the affectation of 
nonchalance, conflicts scholars have had very little to say about intellectual property 
law.  If one scans the principal intellectual property treatises and casebooks, one 
largely finds passing discussion of the traditional trinity of private international law 
(jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments).  The 
same has been true . . . with conflict treatises and casebooks; intellectual property is 
given short shrift.   
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation:  A Vehicle for Resurgent 
Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 429 (2001).  As Professor Dinwoodie notes, 
the lack of engagement between intellectual property and conflicts scholars has produced 
approaches to resolving copyright choice of law issues that are quite different from traditional 
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Identifying the country whose protection is claimed is the starting 
point when engaging in international copyright litigation.  The 
protecting country is the country where the alleged infringing act 
occurred.44  It is well established that the law of the protecting country is 
the applicable law for infringement that occurs in that jurisdiction.45  
Under this approach, if an infringement takes place in Mexico, for 
example, the protecting country will be Mexico.  But this does not 
necessarily mean that the forum country would be Mexico.  This means 
that even if an infringement action is brought to another forum—where 
the defendant has his domicile—the applicable law must be that of 
Mexico.46 
As already mentioned, the territorial character of copyright law has 
led to the creation of several copyright and neighboring rights 
conventions.  Like the Berne Convention, almost all the conventions 
have included the national treatment principle and several minimum 
rights.  Therefore, when applying foreign copyright law, the outcome 
must be somehow predictable in that it must conform to treaty 
obligations, such as protected subject matter and remedies.  This is 
significant because efforts to harmonize create certainty in cases 
involving acts that occur abroad or in cases with international elements. 
The proposed mechanism may apply to cases where, for one reason 
or another, the protecting country is different than the forum country.  
In those cases, the forum country may issue injunctive relief enforceable 
in the protecting country, if it contains rights and remedies specifically 
covered by the copyright law of the protecting country or the TRIPs 
Agreement.47  In other words, if the copyright law of the forum country 
provides for rights not contained in the TRIPs Agreement and the 
protecting country does not provide for those rights, then the 
enforcement of the injunctive relief may become uncertain.  This lack of 
regulation may range from moral rights to secondary liability.  However, 
before entering into the details of the proposed mechanism, it is 
 
rules.  Id. at 430. 
 44. 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT § 
3[1][a][i]. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Austin, supra note 14, at 1180 (analyzing recent trends in U.K. and U.S. courts 
rejecting earlier common law assumptions that domestic courts lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over foreign copyright infringements). 
 47. The TRIPs Agreement can be characterized as one of the most important 
harmonization efforts—it first brought harmony to its large membership and then brought 
intellectual property into the fields of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its dispute 
resolution procedures. 
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important to analyze some details about the applicable law in 
international litigation. 
Unlike cases in the past when hard copies made it easier to locate 
the place of infringement, now technological developments have made 
this locating task more complex.  An infringement might include several 
acts that generally are divided as follows:  initiating acts, like making 
copies or sending communication signals; intermediate acts, including 
the importation of copies or the relaying of a signal; and consummating 
acts, like the reception of the signal and sales of materials where the 
copyright is fixed.48  Complex cases may involve any of those infringing 
acts taking place in several jurisdictions—for instance, the transmission 
of infringing materials posted on the Internet may create uncertainty 
about the applicable law, though arguably it would be the law of the 
country of reception.  In such cases there will be several protecting 
countries whose copyright laws should be analyzed by the forum court.  
However, courts have not always taken this approach when deciding 
this kind of case.  While some courts apply forum copyright legislation 
to acts occurring abroad, adding an extraterritorial effect to their 
domestic law, others only apply the law of the place where the act took 
place.49  The location of where the infringement occurred could also be 
complicated in the context of the Internet or electronic communications 
and its determination could open the possibility of not explicitly 
applying the law of the forum extraterritorially.  Another approach is to 
apply the law of the place where the infringement caused damages. 
The U.S. case of Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television 
International, Ltd. provides a useful illustration of how courts may differ 
when deciding the applicable law of cases involving acts committed 
abroad.50  In 1992, a news company took videos of the riots in Los 
Angeles.51  Those videos were transmitted to other news agencies within 
the United States who, without licenses, copied them and then 
retransmitted them abroad, principally to European television.52  In that 
 
 48. See 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT § 
3[1][b][iii][A]. 
 49. In an article aimed at criticizing choice of law rules that attempt to avoid the 
“bramble bush” of foreign copyright laws, Professor Austin argues that, “at least for the time 
being, the preferable approach is for domestic courts to apply the relevant foreign laws to 
each instance of foreign infringement.”  Austin, supra note 1, at 4. 
 50. L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1265 (C.D. Cal. 
1996). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1267. 
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case, the district court established that the retransmission was only 
completed upon reception abroad.53  The court also ruled that the 
“[d]efendants are not liable under the Copyright Act for damages 
arising extraterritorially.  This holding does not preclude LA News from 
recovering damages for extraterritorial infringement.  It can seek a 
remedy for this infringement under the applicable foreign law.”54  
Nevertheless, on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed and established that, because the unauthorized copies were 
made in the United States, relief might be granted under U.S. law for 
the exploitation abroad, just as if the exploitation had taken place within 
the United States.55  The court pointed out that “[r]ecovery of damages 
arising from overseas infringing uses was allowed because the predicate 
act of infringement occurring within the United States enabled further 
reproduction abroad.”56  While the district court relied on a previous 
decision establishing that the mere authorization in the United States of 
acts of infringement abroad does not violate the U.S. Copyright Act,57 
the appellate court distinguished that decision by establishing that the 
case in front of it was not about authorization, but rather about how the 
making of copies enabled the infringement abroad.58 
Generally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
upheld the application of the U.S. Copyright Act for the distribution of 
materials abroad when the originating copy was made in the United 
States.59  However, until the Los Angeles News Service decision, the 
Ninth Circuit had been reluctant to apply the U.S. Copyright Act to acts 
involving the “mere authorization” to infringe abroad.  It seems that the 
 
 53. See id. at 1269 (quoting Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 
F.3d 381, 387 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1998), 
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1141 (1999). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th  Cir. 
1994).  This decision came under criticism from various sources, including another district 
judge who asserted in a subsequent opinion that “Subafilms ignores . . . the economic 
incentives underpinning the Copyright Clause designed to encourage creation of new works.”  
Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).  “[P]iracy has changed 
since the Barbary days.  Today, the raider need not grab the bounty with his own hands; he 
need only transmit his go-ahead by wire or telefax to start the presses in a distant land.”  Id. 
 58. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1095–98. 
 59. See, e.g., Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ’g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988); Sheldon 
v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940); 
Famous Music Corp. v. Seeco Records, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
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existing split between the Second and the Ninth Circuits has been 
resolved with the Los Angeles News Service decision. 
The difference between the “mere authorization” and “enabling 
infringement” is an example of one of the many complexities related to 
the determination of applicable law.  Those considerations are part of 
the internal law of each country.  In this kind of case, the interpretation 
of what the statute considers an infringement makes it relevant to 
consider where the infringement took place and the degree of 
infringement occurring in one place, and whether its law can be 
applicable to the whole case, even if some of the acts of infringement 
took place abroad.  This is significant for the rules of the proposed 
mechanism because even when a court accepts that the law of the place 
of infringement applies, disagreement regarding the place of 
infringement, itself, could pose a problem. 
In copyright infringement cases, however, the principle that the law 
of the place of infringement determines the applicable law continues to 
be the predominant view among courts and scholars: 
In the absence of a dispositive contract provision or treaty rule, 
the law of the protecting country—the country in which the work 
is being exploited without the copyright owner’s authority—
dominates judicial choice of law respecting the protectability of a 
work and the rights that attach to it . . . . 
 . . . . 
 The general preference for the law of the protecting country 
as applicable law in copyright cases reflects the historic principle 
that copyright is territorial.60 
This choice of law rule can also be based on principles of national 
treatment contained in international copyright conventions. 
The default position of national authors is simple.  Domestic Law 
governs their copyright claims in any case of infringement at 
home. . . . Suppose . . . that a foreign author may assert treaty-
based claims to obtain relief against infringement occurring in a 
treaty country. . . . To assure national treatment, the court has to 
apply . . . the domestic law . . . of the protecting country. . . . Thus 
national treatment leads to results consistent with the choice-of-
law rule traditionally applicable in tort cases.  That is the law of 
the place of the tort, specifically, the place of the infringement in 
a copyright case, applies.61 
 
 60. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 99–100 (2001). 
 61. 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT § 
3[1][a][i]. 
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The importance of this lex loci delicti approach is supported and 
explained by Eugen Ulmer in the following excerpt: 
Logically it does not imply a reference to the lex fori.  If, for 
example, a German impresario performs a protected work in 
Denmark, the author bringing an action in Germany cannot 
claim the protection of German copyright law.  The protection 
which may be claimed . . . may be granted according to German 
law only if the act of infringement is committed in Germany. . . . 
 . . . [W]hen, according to the general rules of procedural law, 
a venue is established within the country, legal protection may be 
claimed before the national court on the basis of the foreign 
copyright or industrial property right. . . . From the point of view 
of private international law it certainly seems consistent to 
expand the rule which may be derived from the conventions into 
a complete rule of conflict of laws whereby . . . irrespective of the 
country in which action is brought, [it] is to be governed by the 
law of the country in whose territory the act of the infringement 
took place.62 
In cases where all the acts of infringement take place in a single foreign 
country, a court may find it less difficult to apply the law governing the 
place of the infringement—a foreign copyright law.  For instance, in 
London Film Productions, Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications, 
Inc.,63 a U.S. court applied foreign law to acts of infringement taking 
place abroad.64  In that case, the defendant licensed the plaintiff’s 
motion pictures in Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Panama.65  
Those motion pictures were in the public domain in the United States, 
but not in those countries where the infringement took place.  The 
district court relied on comity considerations in order to adjudicate the 
infringement of the foreign copyright: 
A concern with the conduct of American citizens in foreign 
countries is merely the reciprocal of that interest.  An 
unwillingness by this Court to hear a complaint . . . to a violation 
of foreign law will engender . . . a similar unwillingness on the 
 
 62. CHRISTOPHER WADLOW, ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (1998) (quoting EUGEN ULMER, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ¶ 14 (1978)). 
 63. London Film Prods., Ltd. v. Intercontinental Commc’ns, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 47 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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part of a foreign jurisdiction when . . . a violation of our laws 
[occurs].66 
This reasoning is quite important; it contains the essence of reciprocity 
and comity that later can become an international treaty. 
Obviously, the district court started its analysis from the 
presumption that the law of the country whose protection is sought—the 
place of infringement—is the governing law in the case.67  However, the 
difficulty in establishing one clear place of infringement, has led to other 
different approaches.  For instance, Professor Jane Ginsburg has 
proposed an alternative choice of law rule: 
[I]f it is possible to localize in the United States the point from 
which the communication of the infringing work (whether or not 
in material form) becomes available to the public (wherever that 
public be located), then U.S. courts should apply U.S. law to all 
unauthorized copies, wherever communicated.  Similarly, where 
the United States is the “nerve center” for foreign distributions, 
the domestic acts of planning and intellectually implementing the 
offshore acts should suffice to justify the application of U.S. law 
to the full series of acts.68 
This approach departs from principles developed by the Second 
Circuit, and arguably the Ninth Circuit, and creates a new rule that is 
perhaps more appropriate for digital environments.  While this 
approach tends to prevent infringing activities in copyright havens or 
countries where the protection is weak, it also could be considered as 
disregarding the territoriality principle of copyright law.  However, this 
approach could represent an option for allowing broader room in 
defining infringement.  But there are activities like “planning and 
intellectually implementing the offshore acts”69 that clearly depart from 
the traditional principles of choice of law for copyright infringement.  In 
the latter case, the issue is not the application of national law to foreign 
infringements because of the difficulty of finding the place of 
infringement, but it is, rather, the deliberate application of national law 
to foreign acts of infringement.  Under no copyright law does the 
planning of an infringement constitute an actual infringement. 
While there could be a different interpretation for determining the 
place of infringement, sometimes the decision is made to disregard the 
 
 66. Id. at 49. 
 67. Id. at 48–49. 
 68. Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in Copyright 
Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 600 (1997). 
 69. Id. 
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place of infringement, itself, only to avoid struggling with foreign 
copyright law.  However, conflict of law choices leading to the 
application of the forum law to acts occurring abroad have been 
criticized as false pragmatism.70  If, in a given case, the application of 
foreign law is not an element for denial to hear a case under the basis of 
forum non conveniens, it would be inconsistent to apply national law to 
acts occurring abroad simply to avoid the complexities of foreign 
copyrights.71  After all, the concern of misapplication of foreign law is 
not exclusive to copyright law but pertains to all areas of conflict of 
laws. 
The choice of law strategies discussed above have awkwardly 
grafted extraterritorial choice of law principles onto a system 
whose central assumptions are based on the territoriality of 
domestic copyright regimes.  Moreover, there are difficult 
questions of domestic and international policy that would appear 
to accompany these choice of law strategies.  Before these choice 
of law strategies are expanded even further, these issues deserve 
more rigorous attention than they have received thus far in legal 
literature.72 
In discussing the “nerve center” choice of law rule, scholar Paul 
Goldstein has recommended that “[n]o proposed choice of law rule for 
copyright cases should be adopted unless the traditional rule is in fact 
deficient.”73  Otherwise, national governments will oppose or resist this 
rule, undercutting their national copyright rule for the same reason they 
have opposed harmonization efforts, like the TRIPs Agreement, in the 
past.74  On the other hand, the traditionally accepted choice of law rule 
generates certainty in the results of litigation.  Another rule is not going 
to be accepted generally and will not be applied consistently among 
courts of several countries.  Moreover, under the proposed mechanism, 
courts will be more willing to enforce an injunction based on foreign law 
that has been chosen reasonably. 
Even if the result is the same as it would have been if explicitly 
applying forum law to acts of infringement committed abroad, 
considerations about the place of infringement could make these kinds 
of decisions more reasonable.  It is different to choose forum law as 
applicable because the court considers that the infringement was 
 
 70. See Austin, supra note 1, at 41. 
 71. See id. at 42. 
 72. Id. at 46–47. 
 73. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 60, at 101. 
 74. See id. at 102. 
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committed, at least partially, in the forum territory, than to apply forum 
law to acts openly committed abroad.  This choice is legitimate if the 
forum law was deemed applicable to acts of infringement made abroad, 
if such law was chosen because of considerations about the place of 
infringement.  A determination that the infringement has taken place 
within the forum because the infringing act was authorized or enabled 
within the forum is a reasonable assessment.  Taking into consideration 
differences in definitions of infringement and reasoning in different 
legal systems may open the door to a more liberal interpretation of the 
Berne Convention choice of law rule.75 
Having established the importance of considerations regarding the 
place of infringement, I will explain the targeted market approach.  This 
approach is based on the suggestion that the different approaches to the 
conflict of laws between the United States—focused on the needs of 
interstate and international systems—and the European Union—
focused on the ordre public international—considered along with the 
objectives of the Berne Convention and the TRIPs Agreement76 have 
resulted in “a globally coherent fabric of remedies, where different 
national laws do not interfere with each other.”77  Under this rule, 
judicial authorities must localize the infringement in the place where it 
was completed.  In order not to lose the big picture in cross-border 
transactions, and instead focus on insolated acts, this “completed act” 
rule calls for a distinction between incoming and outgoing transactions.78  
The localization of the transaction in the incoming market is justified 
based on audience and cultural goods.  It attempts to avoid the 
exportation of policies considered as targeted to national audiences to 
 
 75. Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention contains a rule of choice of law based on 
national treatment.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 
5(2), Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 
[hereinafter Berne Convention].  However, according to Professor Dinwoodie, neither the 
Berne Convention nor the TRIPs Agreement are self-executing in the United States.  See 
Dinwoodie, supra note 43, at 439 n.44.  Therefore this rule is not binding on U.S. courts.  
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this proposed mechanism, it should be binding or, at least 
considered, if copyright holders want U.S. judgments or decrees enforced abroad. 
 76. The preamble of the Berne Convention establishes that enforcement will be carried 
out “in as effective and uniform a manner as possible.”  Berne Convention, supra note 75, 
pmbl.  The preamble of the TRIPs Agreement establishes an “effective and appropriate 
means for . . . enforcement . . . taking into account differences in national legal systems.” 
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, pmbl. 
 77. 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT § 
3[1][b][ii][A]. 
 78. Id. 
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other countries’ audiences.79  The difference between this rule and the 
“nerve center” rule is that the nerve center rule may also include the 
application of the law of the place where foreign infringements were 
planned. 
To illustrate, this rule can be applied to the following case in which 
the outgoing act, committed in Country A, is directed to the market of 
Country B.  This includes, for example, shipping materials that are 
infringing under Country B’s law, the hosting of these materials on a 
Web site, or the up-linking of a satellite signal.  Applying the 
“completed act” conflict of law rule would result in the application of 
the law of Country B to acts committed in Country A. 
The Ninth Circuit, for example, has consistently applied this rule and 
has established that the infringement of the transmission right does not 
occur until the public receives the satellite signal.80  In Allarcom Pay 
Television, Ltd. v. General Instrument Corp., the law of the targeted 
market governed because it was the law of the place where the 
transmission was completed.81  In contrast, the Second Circuit view is 
that the transmission does not need to be received by the public in order 
to constitute an infringement of the public performance or transmission 
right established by the U.S. Copyright Act.82  Under this latter 
approach, the U.S. Copyright Act governs the particular act of up-
linking the signal to a satellite, even if the public is located abroad and 
the transmission was not yet completed.83  The European Satellite and 
Cable Directive also accepts this emission theory, establishing that the 
act of communication to the public occurs in the Member State where 
the signal is up-linked to the satellite.84  In Mexico, Article 140 of the 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
 81. See id. 
 82. See Nat’l Football League v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
 83. See id.  This approach is also shared by the Seventh and Eighth Circuits and the 
respective state courts.  See, e.g., WGN Cont’l Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 
625 (7th Cir. 1982); Coleman v. ESPN, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 290, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Broad. 
Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entm’t Servs., 746 F. Supp. 320, 328–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); 
David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 758–59 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); 
Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. S. Satellite Sys., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 808, 813 (D. Minn. 1984), aff’d, 777 
F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 84. Council Directive 93/83/EEC, Coordination of Certain Rules Concerning Copyright 
and Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to Satellite Broadcasting and Cable 
Retransmission, art. 1(2)(b), 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15.  As defined in the Directive, “[t]he act of 
communication to the public by satellite occurs solely in the Member State where, under the 
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Copyright Act also considers the transmission completed when the 
signal is up-linked to the satellite.85  Both theories—the down-linking 
and up-linking—are not rules of conflict of law, but they are 
considerations or assumptions made about the place where the act of 
transmission is considered to have taken place; however, the result that 
both assumptions produce is ultimately highly related to questions of 
choice of law. 
The completed act rule can be an alternative offering in order to not 
lose the big picture in cross-border transactions, which is a better 
justification than the lex forum rule.  Obviously, it is related to the 
question of where the damage is caused:  if the infringing activities are 
targeted in one market, it is in that market where the copyright holder is 
losing his or her profits; however, the application of the forum law in 
these cases may lead to the unwillingness of a court to enforce injunctive 
decrees or monetary judgments.  Moreover, the application of forum 
law may also lead to the issuance of an injunction over an act considered 
as non-infringing by the law of the country where the act was 
committed. 
This is also an important consideration.  The attempt to apply a 
foreign law to an act committed in a given country can cause several 
problems for various reasons.  Perhaps the act is not an infringement in 
that country.  Furthermore, the application of a foreign law to subjects 
that did not elect the foreign legislators who created the law raises an 
issue of democracy.  How can a subject be governed by a law created by 
foreign legislators and officials who have no national accountability?  If 
the result of this law is not acceptable to nationals, they cannot voice 
their protest in the following elections. Moreover, national groups did 
not participate in the lobbying process or negotiations of that foreign 
law.  Therefore, their only alternative is to trust in national judges—
those same judges who will enforce measures and judgments based on 
the foreign law.  The central issue is that the ideal choice of law rule is 
the one that makes applicable the law of the place of infringement. 
As previously discussed,86 the digital age has created new problems 
that are resolved by old rules.  The balance of those rules with the new 
problems is important for the elaboration of the enforcement 
 
control and responsibility of the broadcasting organization, the programme-carrying signals 
are introduced into an uninterrupted chain of communication leading to the satellite and 
down towards the earth.”  Id. 
 85. Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor [L.F.D.A.] [Federal Copyright Act], art. 140, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 24 de Diciembre de 1996 (Mex.). 
 86. See discussion supra Part I. 
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mechanism.  While there are problems in applying foreign law to certain 
acts of infringement taking place in one country, it is also true that new 
technology makes it easier to distribute infringing materials in several 
jurisdictions with different copyright laws.87  If one puts a Web site on 
the Internet that contains infringing materials that are visible in several 
jurisdictions, that person has the potential to cause damage in all those 
places.  It would not be fair to take advantage of new technology to 
spread infringing materials and, at the same time, use the current rules 
and principles of territoriality to protect oneself from liability.  The 
reason for the proposed mechanism is to balance those differences.  
However, the acceptable choice of law rule for the proposed mechanism 
must be determined.  Besides the obvious prevailing choice of law 
approaches, there are other and different approaches that can be 
created in the future.  As each case arises, courts may consider new 
approaches for determining where the infringement took place. 
The prevailing approach must be one that establishes that the 
applicable law is the law of the place of infringement.88  However, courts 
could be allowed to determine freely where the infringement has taken 
place.  If the determination is reasonable, then the proposed mechanism 
is realistic.89  Moreover, because the existing international copyright 
regime of the TRIPs Agreement and the Berne Convention has led to 
 
 87. According to Professor Dinwoodie, if courts are engaged in serious copyright choice 
of law analysis and sometimes contemplate the application of foreign law, it is necessary to 
engage in comparative work.  Dinwoodie, supra note 43, at 451. 
 88. An alternative is to apply one law for ownership and apply another law to 
infringement.  In Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., the court applied 
Russian law to questions of ownership and U.S. law to questions of infringement:  “On 
infringement issues, the governing conflicts principle is usually lex loci delicti, the doctrine 
generally applicable to torts. . . . In the pending case, the place of the tort is plainly the United 
States.”  Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 89. But see Nathan R. Wollman, Maneuvering Through the Landmines of 
Multiterritorial Copyright Litigation:  How to Avoid the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality When Attempting to Recover for the Foreign Exploitation of U.S. 
Copyrighted Works, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 343, 391 (2002) (suggesting that “justifications for 
the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. copyright law are so strong 
with respect to this federal statute that the presumption . . . itself is the first major hurdle for a 
U.S. rights holder”).  The article enumerates some of the arguments for territorial U.S. 
copyright law.  Id. at 348–50.  Then the author offers “loopholes” in order to overcome those 
territorial conceptions.  Id. at 367–78.  Finally, it shows certain jurisdictional concerns in order 
to recover.  Id. at 380–90.  However, no consideration is given to the situation in which a 
defendant has no assets, domicile, or other way to pursue enforcement within the United 
States. 
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the creation of a “coherent fabric of remedies”90 with rules that do not 
interfere with each other, based on the needs of the international system 
and on the ordre public international, this could be used as an argument 
for applying the law of the place where the infringement occurred.91  
The same argument could be used to allow courts to determine the 
place of infringement.  It might also be feasible to hold a convention to 
determine where the infringement took place and assess the applicable 
law.  However, because countries are not likely to reach a consensus on 
this issue, this ambitious plan could fail as have other attempts to 
harmonize international litigation.  Furthermore, as new technologies 
emerge, the set of rules for determining the place of infringement could 
become obsolete even before consensus is achieved. 
III.  EXERCISING RIGHTS IN THE RIGHT FORUM—QUESTIONS OF 
JURISDICTION 
Taking jurisdiction over acts occurring abroad may be controversial.  
The considerations to be discussed here cover European and common 
law approaches; while both systems have remarkable differences 
reflected in the difficulties in achieving an international convention on 
jurisdiction and judgments, several existing principles can be the basis 
for the proposed mechanism without relying on the Hague Draft 
Convention.92  Obviously, the proposed mechanism is independent from 
the failed Hague Draft Convention.  This is because there are several 
convergences in both systems that may allow the application of the 
mechanism in several infringement cases. 
 
 90. 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT § 
3[1][b][ii][A]. 
 91. Paul Edward Geller, International Intellectual Property, Conflicts of Laws, and 
Internet Remedies, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 130 (2005). 
 92. Note, for example, instances of common ground between the two approaches as 
evidenced by the United Kingdom and Ireland.  The United Kingdom and Ireland, common 
law tradition countries, have implemented European Union regulations and given up several 
common law approaches.  See Brandon B. Danford, The Enforcement of Foreign Money 
Judgments in the United States and Europe:  How Can We Achieve a Comprehensive Treaty?, 
23 REV. LITIG. 381, 411 (2004).  But the problems associated with the Hague Draft 
Convention evidence persistent challenges of achieving an international convention, 
specifically with respect to enforcing international judgments in the midst of sometimes 
divergent systems.  Hague Conference on Private International Law, Draft Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 30, 1999, 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd11.pdf [hereinafter Hague Draft Convention].  
Nevertheless, the proposed mechanism seeks to carve out the areas of common ground to 
create opportunities for improved enforcement and protection of the rights of copyright 
holders. 
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Allow me to first briefly discuss some relevant aspects of jurisdiction 
in the European Union and common law countries.  This is not a 
complete survey on jurisdiction; it only covers the important aspects of 
litigation related to copyright infringement.  A brief explanation about 
the difficulties presented in the negotiations of the proposed Hague 
Draft Convention will follow.  I will then propose an alternative under 
which the proposed mechanism may be applied without the Hague 
Draft Convention. 
A.  Jurisdiction in European Union or Civil Law Tradition Countries 
The European Union regulations are representative of how civil law 
tradition countries deal with questions of jurisdiction.  In 1968, the 
European Union developed the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(Brussels Convention).93  The European Union also developed the 
Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters (Lugano Convention) in 1988, with 
similar provisions expanding the Brussels Convention to non-member 
states belonging to the European Free Trade Agreement Area 
(EFTA).94  Both Conventions, however, have been superseded by the 
European Union Council Regulation on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (EC Regulation).95  The EC Regulation entered into force on 
March 1, 2002.96  It does not apply between Denmark and other 
European Union members, but in this case the Brussels Convention still 
applies.97  It is also composed of the same provisions as the Brussels 
Convention except for the enumeration of some of its provisions.98 
 
 93. 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter Brussels 
Convention]; see Council Regulation 44/2001, Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, pmbl. (5), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 
[hereinafter EC Regulation]. 
 94. Convention on the Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9 [hereinafter Lugano Convention]; see 
EC Regulation, supra note 93, pmbl. (5). 
 95. EC Regulation, supra note 93, pmbl. (5). 
 96. Id. art. 76. 
 97. Id. pmbl. (22). 
 98. In an article that compares the approaches of U.S. and European jurisdictions, 
Professor Juenger remarks on the impressive progress made by the European Community in 
a remarkably short time.  He notes that where “multistate jurisdictional problems are 
amenable to rational solutions . . . national sovereignty need not inhibit the framing of 
workable rules.”  Friedrich Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the 
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The general rule about jurisdiction of the EC Regulation is 
contained in Article 2, which establishes that “persons domiciled in a 
Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of 
that Member State.”99  As an exception, Article 5(3) establishes that a 
Member State may be sued in another Member State “in matters 
relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where 
the harmful event occurred or may occur.”100  The place where the 
harmful effect occurred has been construed quite broadly to cover the 
place where the commencing act took place or the place where the 
damages were suffered.101  However, a key decision has determined a 
limitation of jurisdiction; while the court of the place where the 
defendant has his or her domicile may award damages in that country 
and abroad,102 courts having jurisdiction based on Article 5(3) can only 
award damages suffered in the forum country: 
On a proper construction of the expression place where the 
harmful event occurred in article 5(3) . . . the victim of a libel by 
a newspaper article distributed in several contracting states may 
bring an action for damages against the publisher either before 
the courts of the contracting state of the place where the 
publisher of the defamatory publication is established, which 
have jurisdiction to award damages for all the harm caused by 
the defamation, or before the courts of each contracting state in 
which the publication was distributed and where the victim 
claims to have suffered injury to his reputation, which have 
jurisdiction to rule solely in respect of the harm caused in the 
state of the court seised.103 
Another basis for jurisdiction is established by Article 6(1) of the 
EC Regulation, which establishes that a court may exercise jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant if he or she is one of a number of 
defendants for actions closely connected and “it is expedient to hear and 
determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments 
resulting from separate proceedings.”104  This provision is similar to 
those provisions contained in several Mexican codes of civil procedure, 
including the Nuevo Leon Code of Civil Procedure, which established 
 
European Communities:  A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1212 (1984). 
 99. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 2(1). 
 100. Id. art. 5(3). 
 101. See 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT § 
6[1][a]. 
 102. See Case C-68/93, Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA, 1995 E.C.R. I-415. 
 103. Id. 
 104. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 6(1). 
BARBOSA ARTICLE  
2007] INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND LITIGATION 103 
 
that “when there are several defendants having different domiciles, 
jurisdiction shall be for the court of the domicile chosen by plaintiff.”105  
The Mexican Supreme Court has held that such legal precepts are 
constitutional.106  Similarly, this kind of legal precept would pass any 
constitutional test in countries belonging to the civil law tradition 
system.  Moreover, it is important to note that, contrary to Article 6(1) 
of the EC Regulation, equivalent Mexican provisions have no 
requirements aimed at avoiding the risk of inconsistent judgments.107  
But it is also important to note that jurisdiction over a non-forum 
resident taken by this multi-defendant approach can be difficult to 
enforce in common law countries. 
Another important provision of the EC Regulation for intellectual 
property litigation is established by Article 22(4), giving exclusive 
jurisdiction for the courts where the deposit or registration has been 
applied in “proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of 
patents, trade marks, designs, or other similar rights required to be 
deposited or registered.”108  However, because Article 5(2) of the Berne 
Convention establishes that copyright protection “shall not be subject to 
any formality” regulation, Article 22(4) is inapplicable to copyright 
litigation.109  Because copyright is obtained upon fixation and not by a 
decision of government officials, there is no need to enter into the 
controversial task for a court to question the validity of activities of a 
foreign government official.  This task is considered improper in most 
courts and creates several difficulties.110 
Even if the EC Regulation does not codify the common law doctrine 
of forum non conveniens, it precludes courts from declining jurisdiction 
or dismissing a case based on it.111  The EC Regulation takes from the 
 
 105. Código de Procedimientos Civiles de estado de Nuevo Leon [C.P.C.] [Nuevo Leon 
Code of Civil Procedure], art. 111(IV), 3 de Febrero de 1973 (Mex.) (translated by author).  
Most of the states have similar provisions in their respective civil procedure codes. 
 106. See TERCERA SALA COMPETENCIA CIVIL, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de 
Justicia [S.C.J.N.] [Supreme Court],  Semanario Judicial de la Federación, Octava Epoca, 
tomo X, Agosto de 1992, 52/92, Página 147 (Mex.).  This resolution decided a conflict on 
jurisdiction between the First Civil District Court in the Federal District and the Fifth District 
Court in the State of Mexico. 
 107. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 6(1). 
 108. Id. art. 22(4). 
 109. Berne Convention, supra note 75. 
 110. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. 
denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956) (discussing the difficulties arising in the trademark context).  
However, copyright is different than trademark since it is obtained at the moment of fixation, 
not by a decision of an official.  See Berne Convention, supra note 75, art. 5(2). 
 111. See 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT § 
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civil law the obligation for judges to exercise their jurisdiction unless 
statutory provisions establish otherwise.112  The key provision of the EC 
Regulation is that orders and judgments of courts located in one 
Member State can be enforced in courts of another.  Article 32 defines 
“judgment” as including decrees, orders, decisions, writs of execution, as 
well as the determination of costs.113  The EC Regulation compels courts 
to enforce those orders and judgments without reviewing the merits.114  
Therefore, a party that has prevailed in a judgment rendered in a 
European Member State can enforce it across Member States without a 
re-hearing on the merits.  The grounds for non-recognition are limited 
to the following:  matters of public policy for the enforcing country, 
default judgments for lack of appearance, cases in which service of 
process was not given properly, and instances governed by res judicata 
when the judgment is inconsistent with prior judgments between the 
parties.115 
The broad definition of judgment established by Article 32 and 
covered by the enforcement procedures arguably includes preliminary 
injunctions.116  However, obtaining a preliminary injunction in one 
country and trying to enforce it in another is quite controversial and 
there are only a few cases in which this actually has occurred.117  
Moreover, when interpreting the Brussels Convention enforcement 
procedures, the European Court of Justice has determined that 
preliminary injunctions directed against a party who had not been 
summoned are not covered.118  This is because under the Brussels 
Convention, grounds for non-recognition include a default judgment or 
a decision rendered without service of process.119  If this becomes a 
problem within the European Union, where substantive and procedural 
harmonization exists, such enforcement may become more difficult in 
 
6[1][a].  The holding in Coin Controls, Ltd. v. Suzo Int’l (UK) Ltd. also illustrates that a 
dismissal based on forum non conveniens is not available if the Brussels Convention applies.  
Coin Controls, Ltd. v. Suzo Int’l (UK) Ltd. [1997] F.S.R. 660 (Ch.). 
 112. See 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT § 
6[1][a]; see also Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status of American Law in the Hague 
Judgments Convention Project, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1283, 1297 (1998). 
 113. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 32. 
 114. See id. art. 36. 
 115. See id. art. 33. 
 116. Id. art. 32. 
 117. See 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT § 
6[1][a]; see also Symposium, supra note 7, at 48. 
 118. Case 125/79, Denilauler v. SNC Couchet Frères, 1980 E.C.R. 1553. 
 119. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 33. 
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litigation involving third countries—for instance, an injunction issued in 
the United States for enforcement in Mexico or another country in 
Latin America. 
[O]n the preliminary injunctions, temporary restraining order, as 
a general matter, it would be very difficult if not impossible to 
have a preliminary judgment enforced in any other country.  
There is a strong opposition to enforcing preliminary . . . 
judgments because there has been no full trial on the merits, so 
that will be the likely choice only if you have an opportunity to 
locally enforce that preliminary measure.120  
This reality represents one of the main difficulties for the proposed 
mechanism, including a way to enforce preliminary injunctions abroad.  
Perhaps this is the main difficulty for the proposed mechanism.  I will, 
however, endeavor to address this problem through one of the proposed 
paths.  An injunction to stop an actual and clear infringement would not 
be difficult if this procedural remedy is also available in courts of the 
country whose protection is sought and if the defendant was given a 
proper service of process. 
The EC Regulation also offers an alternative for overcoming the 
aforementioned problem.121  Article 31 of the EC Regulation allows the 
application of provisional measures in a Member State even if the 
Regulation mandates jurisdiction on the merits in another Member 
State: 
Application may be made to the courts of a Member State for 
such provisional, including protective, measures as may be 
available under the law of that State, even if, under this 
Regulation, the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction 
as to the substance of the matter.122 
Therefore, right holders may apply for preliminary injunctive relief in 
one Member State even if jurisdiction will be taken by a court of 
another Member State.  For instance, in cases where the infringement 
originates in one Member State but has effects in another, it is possible 
to apply for preliminary injunctive relief in the originating country and 
then to adjudicate the case in another Member State where the 
infringement caused most of the damage. 
 
 120. Symposium, supra note 7, at 48. 
 121. See EC Regulation, supra note 93. 
 122. Id. art. 31. 
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B.  Jurisdiction in the United States and Common Law Tradition 
Countries 
I briefly turn now to a discussion of common law approaches to 
jurisdiction.  The EC Regulation is highly influenced by the civil law 
tradition;123 therefore, the analysis of common law approaches on 
jurisdiction will focus on the United States rather than the United 
Kingdom.  Obviously, there are U.S. constitutional principles that are 
not present in other common law tradition countries, but the U.S. 
approach is still the most representative.124 
Under U.S. law, there are two important aspects related to 
jurisdiction.  First, there can be jurisdiction over nonresidents 
committing acts abroad that have effects in the United States.125  Second, 
a court that has jurisdiction to hear a case may dismiss it under the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens.126  Both characteristics are not 
present in civil law countries, where jurisdiction is expected to be taken 
in the location where the defendant is domiciled, and courts are bound 
to hear a case if they have jurisdiction over it. 
For copyright cases, including those where the infringement has 
occurred abroad, 
[f]ederal courts in the United States have personal jurisdiction if, 
along with proper service, there are contacts sufficient under 
constitutional and statutory criteria; they have subject-matter 
jurisdiction in cases that include, most relevantly for our 
purposes, parties of diverse citizenship or actions arising under 
the Copyright Act or U.S. treaties.127 
Personal jurisdiction can be exercised over a nonresident defendant 
committing acts outside the forum that have effects within the forum.  In 
order to establish if there is jurisdiction, the court must look first to the 
long-arm statute of the state where the court is sitting; if the individual 
activity or situation meets the statutory provision, the court must 
 
 123. See Ana Gardella & Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Civil Law, Common Law and 
Market Integration:  The EC Approach to Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 611, 
612 (2003). 
 124. In the United Kingdom, for example, the minimum contacts principles are not 
applied as they would be in the United States.  See also Zekoll, supra note 112, at 1290 
(arguing that even if the Brussels and Lugano Conventions fill the gap between the United 
Kingdom and its civil law tradition neighbors, that is not likely the case in other common law 
tradition countries like the United States). 
 125. See 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. USA 
§ 8[3][a]. 
 126. Id. 
 127. 1 id. ch. INT §  6[1][b]. 
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establish if the exercise of jurisdiction in that specific case is within due 
process or constitutional requirements.128 
For instance, in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, the Second 
Circuit analyzed New York law and established that the conduct of the 
nonresident defendant did not comport with the statutory provisions 
and therefore it was not necessary to analyze if the exercise of 
jurisdiction was within constitutional limits.129  State long-arm statutes 
may vary.  In this case, the New York statute established the 
circumstances under which a court may exercise jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendants committing acts outside the state.  The court 
interpreted the limits to its jurisdiction as follows: 
[T]he New York Legislature enacted sub-paragraph (a)(3), 
which provides in pertinent part that New York courts may 
exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who commits a 
tortious act without the state, causing injury to person or 
property within the state. . . . [I]t restricted the exercise of 
jurisdiction under sub-paragraph (a)(3) to persons who expect or 
should reasonably expect the tortious act to have consequences 
in the state and in addition derive substantial revenue from 
interstate commerce.130 
If the state long-arm statute otherwise establishes jurisdiction, the 
next step then is to analyze if the exercise of jurisdiction in that case is 
within the constitutional limits.  The determination of whether the 
exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant case complies with 
due process is generally made by a three-part test: 
(1) [t]he nonresident defendant must do some act or 
consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some 
act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of 
conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws[;] (2) [t]he claim must be one which 
arises out of or results from his forum-related activities[; and] (3) 
[e]xercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.131 
Those acts established by the first part of the test may include an 
economic transaction within the state, an agent or a representative 
within the state, toll-free numbers or other targeted market activities 
 
 128. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27–28 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 29. 
 131. Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977).  
These factors were articulated in Data Disc as an “approach to evaluation” and later 
reiterated as a three-part test.  See, e.g., Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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directed to the state, or Internet accesses by residents of the state 
measured by the number of clicks and the grade of interactivity of the 
home page.  While those factors may influence the exercise of 
jurisdiction, there is no clear rule about jurisdiction of a U.S. federal 
court over a nonresident defendant committing acts outside the state. 
The previously mentioned elements are analyzed as each case is 
presented, and, therefore, there is no absolute certainty about the 
outcome.  What is certain is that U.S. federal courts can exercise 
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant committing infringing acts abroad 
that have effects in the United States.  Otherwise, under civil law 
tradition, the only court that has jurisdiction in torts or quasi-delict 
actions is the court of the place where the defendant has his or her 
domicile.  Therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant committing acts abroad can be exorbitant in the view of some 
civil law tradition lawyers, including judges, because Article 5(3) of the 
EC Regulation is not common in all civil law tradition countries.132  On 
the contrary, certain “normal” rules of several civil law tradition 
countries could be unacceptable under common law or the U.S. 
constitutional view—for instance, the exercise of jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant without connections with the forum just because 
he or she is one of multiple defendants or, for example, the application 
of Article 14 of the French Civil Code establishing that a French 
national can sue anyone in a French court.133  Obviously, the latter 
provision is not applicable if the EC Regulation applies, but if not, those 
kinds of provisions would apply. 
Another important doctrine of the U.S. legal system that is absent—
or in some cases, proscribed—in civil law tradition countries and the EC 
Regulation is the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  Under this 
doctrine, a court with jurisdiction may dismiss a case for other reasons.  
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, the U.S. Supreme Court established private 
and public factors to be considered in order to dismiss an action on the 
grounds of forum non conveniens.134  The private factors included the 
relatively easy access to sources of proof like the availability of 
compulsory processes to get evidence and costs, the possibility to view 
premises, and factors related to practical problems that make the trial 
easy and inexpensive.135  Public factors included the administrative 
 
 132. See EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 5(3). 
 133. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 14 (Fr.). 
 134. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
 135. Id. at 508. 
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difficulties of the court when hearing the case, especially the application 
of a foreign statute, and the local interests in having that controversy 
resolved in a home court.136  The doctrine of forum non conveniens, as 
established in Gilbert, has evolved and now the threshold analysis is 
whether there is an alternative forum for the action.137  If there is an 
alternative forum, then the analysis of public and private factors can be 
performed.138 
IV.  THE FAILED HAGUE DRAFT CONVENTION–AN EXPLANATION OF 
ITS INEFFECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 
A proposed mechanism for enforcing preliminary injunctions or 
judgments in copyright actions may be possible despite the failure of the 
proposed Hague Draft Convention.  It is first important, though, to 
consider how and why those negotiations failed. 
There were several difficulties in completing the Hague Draft 
Convention project.  Consensus among the parties was difficult because 
of several differences in their respective legal systems.  The difficulties 
mentioned here are based on those described by an author that served 
on the U.S. delegation at the Hague Conference.139  The first is that the 
European Union had previously held the Brussels Convention, the 
Lugano Convention, and developed the EC Regulation.  The bargaining 
position of the European Union has been to work and sign agreements 
based on rules that have worked in the past.  There is also a fear of U.S. 
monetary damages awards like, for example, the highly publicized 
multi-million dollar judgments for injuries suffered due to hot coffee.140 
Another reason is that the United States has not written rules about 
jurisdiction.  It developed its law in this area based on U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting the Due Process Clause.  Those principles 
were developed not by statutory enactment, but by interpretation 
 
 136. Id. at 508–09. 
 137. See id.; see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981); Bodner v. 
Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (indicating that lack of comparable 
laws and opportunities for redress in alternative forum is considered in assessing forum non 
conveniens and conflict of law). 
 138. See 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. INT § 
6[1][b]. 
 139. See Peter D. Trooboff, Ten (and Probably More) Difficulties in Negotiating a 
Worldwide Convention on International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments:  Some 
Initial Lessons, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS:  LESSONS FROM THE 
HAGUE 263 (John J. Barceló III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002). 
 140. See, e.g., Bryan Miller, Hey, Waiter!  Now There’s a Lawyer in My Soup, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1995, at D16. 
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establishing principles of “fundamental notions of fair play and 
substantial justice,” “purposeful availment,” “reasonableness,” and 
others.141  Even if those principles are codified by the American Law 
Institute in a Restatement, their incorporation into an international 
agreement that will be interpreted by courts in different countries is 
unlikely.142  Those principles, even if codified in an international 
agreement, are not likely to be applied properly due to the formalistic 
approaches of civil law tradition countries, as in the approach reflected 
in the Hague Draft Convention.143  This represents a problem for 
bargaining in an international jurisdiction convention.  Even if those 
U.S. principles had been codified in the Hague Draft Convention, it was 
very unlikely that they would be applied as planned.144 
In addition, there are several principles that came from the Brussels 
Convention, now included in the EC Regulation, that would be 
unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution.  For instance, jurisdiction 
based only on the place where the injury was caused is contained in 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention.145  In such a case, there is no 
other connection by the defendant with the forum.  Another example is 
Article 6, establishing that the jurisdiction in a case with multiple 
defendants will be the court of the domicile of the defendant chosen by 
the right holder.146  In this case, the rest of the defendants have no 
connection at all with the forum. 
Lack of consensus was also due to Article 5(5), which was added to 
the Hague Draft Convention.147  This legal precept prohibits jurisdiction 
that otherwise can be asserted by a U.S. court.148  It limits jurisdiction 
over foreign defendants that have activities within the forum to disputes 
related to operations of a branch agency or establishment.149  Therefore, 
if there is no legal presence in the United States, a foreign company 
could not be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, even if it is 
 
 141. Trooboff, supra note 139, at 265. 
 142. See id. at 266. 
 143. See id. at 268. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Brussels Convention, supra note 93, art. 5(3); see EC Regulation, supra note 93, 
art. 5(3). 
 146. Brussels Convention, supra note 93, art. 6; see EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 6. 
 147. Brussels Convention, supra note 93, art. 5(5); see EC Regulation, supra note 93, 
art. 5(5). 
 148. See supra note 147. 
 149. See supra note 147. 
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engaged in a wide range of activities.150  The nonconformity by U.S. 
negotiators is described in the following statement:  “[i]n brief, the U.S. 
courts base their assertion of personal jurisdiction on the relationship of 
the defendant to the forum state and not on the particular legal 
structure of such activity.”151 
The EC Regulation also establishes certain measures to protect 
consumers and employees.  Those protections specify that consumers 
and employees are not bound by choice of forum clauses until a dispute 
actually arises.  The negotiator, Peter D. Trooboff, found that those 
European public policies should not be exported worldwide; he also 
stressed the opposition of American and even European companies to 
being subject to jurisdiction abroad despite the presence of a contrary 
choice of forum clause.152  Moreover, there were concerns about the 
advent of the Internet because providers of goods and services “do not 
even know where their consumers are located.”153  There is also the 
argument that if the consumers agree by “click” agreement not to sue 
the provider in their home courts, they should honor that agreement.154  
In addition, even if the EC Regulation prohibits the use of the forum 
non conveniens doctrine, Article 22 of the Hague Draft Convention 
allows for its application in a very limited form.  The doctrine would not 
be applied to consumer or employee contracts, and, where applicable, 
there would be a security when jurisdiction of the alternative forum is 
based on national law rather than conventional law.155 
Another difficulty was the discussion of the disconnection clause 
contained in Article 37.156  There were several European proposals in 
order to exclude the Hague Draft Convention in cases where the 
Brussels Convention or the EC Regulation applies.  While other 
delegations sought a worldwide convention taking precedence over 
regional conventions, the Europeans preferred to preserve the 
prevalence of the EC Regulation.  This problem is not easily overcome; 
if such a “disconnection clause” were to succeed along with the Hague 
Draft Convention, then suits brought within the European Union by a 
 
 150. Trooboff, supra note 139, at 269. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. at 270. 
 153. Id. at 271. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 272. 
 156. Id. at 273–74. 
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citizen of another Hague Member State would be governed by the EC 
Regulation instead of the Hague Draft Convention.157 
The problems described above were not the only difficulties in 
achieving the consensus necessary to crystallize an international 
convention on jurisdiction and enforcement.  In proposing this 
mechanism, I will posit a new set of rules, different from those rules that 
failed in the prior negotiation stage.158  The rules I propose will be based 
on the convergence of both common law and civil law traditions.  The 
emphasis is not on the different approaches on jurisdiction that both 
legal traditions have, but on a point in between that is hopefully 
acceptable for all. 
V.  PROPOSED MECHANISM 
As was previously mentioned, the proposed mechanism offers three 
alternative paths for a solution—making provisions for possible failures.  
The first path is based on an international convention on jurisdiction 
and recognition of judgments and decrees from copyright cases; the 
second is based on comity; and the third is premised on a reliance on 
administrative remedies available in countries where the rate of piracy is 
unusually high.  The first path is the most important—and ambitious—
proposal of this Article. 
A.  International Convention on Recognition of Copyright Decrees and 
Judgments 
As experience has shown, an international convention on 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is rather difficult to 
achieve.  There are no conventions of this kind at a multilateral level 
and only a few bilateral treaties, besides the EC Regulations, have 
succeeded in their negotiations.  The primary reason for difficulties in 
achieving a convention on recognition and enforcement at the 
multilateral level is related to discrepancies among countries in their 
rules to assess jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.159  Also, there is 
a fear of large punitive damages awards.160  However, if the scope of an 
international convention is restricted to copyright litigation where there 
are no punitive damages and where different laws seem to be better 
 
 157. Id. at 274–75. 
 158. Areas of disagreement also have been identified by other scholars.  See, e.g., 
Danford, supra note 92, at 408–14. 
 159. See supra Part IV. 
 160. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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harmonized with similar remedies, the likelihood of successful 
negotiations will increase. 
This was likely the case for the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York 
Convention) and the Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention); both have a large 
number of adherents and are widely recognized.161  This large 
acceptance is due to the fact that both conventions are applicable only 
to cases of arbitration where there is an arbitral agreement or clause 
among parties and there are grounds for non-recognition.  Grounds for 
non-recognition include arbitral awards not covered by the convention 
and circumstances such that it would be against domestic public policy.162  
The limitation in the application—not to all cases, but just for arbitral 
cases—and the inclusion of grounds for non-recognition, including 
domestic public policy, were the key provisions for the acceptance of 
these conventions. 
Having explained the difficulties of a general litigation jurisdiction 
and enforcement convention, I now turn to an explanation of the 
proposed bases for a possible convention that will cover copyright 
infringement cases.  The first issue that I will examine is the application 
of the proposed convention, then questions of jurisdiction and 
applicable law, problems with preliminary injunctions, and finally, 
grounds for non-recognition. 
1.  Application 
These proposed bases are limited to copyright infringement cases.  
Their scope is not open to other intellectual property rights.  Due to the 
non-formalities requirement of the Berne Convention, copyrights are in 
the best position to be litigated internationally; no copyright prosecution 
is necessary to obtain protection so copyrighted works are protected 
automatically in the Member States of major copyright conventions.163  
There is no need for an administrative determination regarding the 
 
 161. See, e.g., Organization of American States, B-35:  Inter-American Convention on 
International Commercial Arbitration, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-35.html (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2006) (stating that there are nineteen parties to the convention as of 1995); 
WIPO, Parties to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/ny-convention/parties.html (last visited Dec. 
22, 2006) (stating that there are 137 parties to the convention as of Jan. 30, 2006). 
 162. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 
5, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 163. Berne Convention, supra note 75, art. 5(2). 
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creation of the right, and consequently, it is not necessary to review any 
act of any official, either national or foreign.164  There are some 
countries in which available remedies are limited if there is no 
registration, but most countries do not restrict remedies if the work is 
not registered.  Copyrights are different than trademarks or patents 
where the validity of the act of issuance could be at stake in each 
infringement action commenced by the holder because copyrights do 
not depend on the issuance of a title for their creation.165 
In the course of copyright litigation, several things have to be 
demonstrated by the plaintiff and several defenses may be pursued by 
the defendant.  As long as these questions are present in litigation, they 
must be resolved by the court hearing the case.  Therefore, even if an 
infringement of a copyright is the threshold and arguably the unique 
cause of action for which this proposal would apply, there are other 
themes that incidentally need to be covered here, including ownership, 
protected subject matter, and the taking of an idea. 
In an action for copyright infringement, the plaintiff has to 
demonstrate that he or she is the holder of a valid copyright and that the 
defendant is infringing one or more of his or her exclusive rights.166  
There could be cases in which the defendant copied the whole of the 
plaintiff’s valid work with no excusatory defenses or fair use.  Even so, 
the defendant can claim a wide range of defenses, including arguing that 
the plaintiff has no title over the copyright in the place where the 
infringement took place or in any place.  If this is the case, the court 
must look to the original copyright holder and then try to find the chain 
of titles until it reaches the plaintiff.  In this kind of case, the court must 
look into the details of the applicable law of each assignment and into 
the assignment agreement, itself.  Therefore, while this proposal is not 
intended to cover ownership, at any time in an infringement action a 
court may resolve questions of ownership, and so the proposal will cover 
 
 164. See supra note 110. 
 165. Obviously, this is not intended for defamation or libel actions.  The challenges in 
those actions are different from those in international copyright litigation.  Unlike copyright 
law, which is harmonized at some point by international conventions, the underlying policies 
governing defamation and libel actions are very different in each country.  The complexities 
of defamation and libel actions may include injunctions to not litigate, free speech issues, or 
other various claims.  For a complete analysis, see John Di Bari, A Survey of the Internet 
Jurisdiction Universe, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 123 (2005). 
 166. See, e.g., 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. 
INT §§ 4–5. 
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those questions.  Another determination would create an escape for 
defendants that would operate by questioning the plaintiff’s title. 
It is also important to note cases where the infringement is not as 
obvious.  Those cases involve a defendant taking ideas or non-original 
parts of the work so that courts have to look carefully into the details of 
the applicable copyright law in order to determine what constitutes an 
infringement.  Other infringement actions may involve situations in 
which there is no other expression available for the defendant to use the 
underlying idea.  If this is the case, the protection of that work would be 
more limited.  However, this limited protection could change if the 
applicable law changes. 
Even if there are differences in the means of resolving all possible 
questions that arise in copyright infringement cases, those questions 
must be resolved according to the applicable law chosen.  Because there 
is some degree of harmonization, most of those questions are likely to 
be resolved in a predictable way.  Consequently, the proposal will cover 
all the necessary questions to be resolved in an infringement action 
according to the applicable law chosen. 
2.  Jurisdiction 
As for the question of jurisdiction, it is important to find a point of 
convergence in both legal traditions.167  In this Article, there are 
explanations of how the assessment of jurisdiction works in each legal 
tradition.  While the differences are remarkable, it is also true that there 
is a point in the middle that could be acceptable for lawyers on both 
sides of those legal traditions.  I will revisit briefly the bases for 
jurisdiction in both legal systems and then find the points of 
convergence that will be used for the proposed convention. 
In order to determine jurisdiction, there are several key provisions 
worth noting from the EC Regulation that are representative of the civil 
law tradition approach.168  Article 2 establishes the domicile of the 
defendant as a general rule for jurisdiction.169  If a defendant resides in 
one state, he or she may be sued in that state.  This provision does not 
represent any conflict with common law tradition approaches where 
similar rules could apply.  However, while there is a tendency to forum 
 
 167. If the court rendering judgment finds jurisdiction that is so exorbitant that it is 
regarded as excessive by other countries, this will pose an obstacle to getting the judgment 
enforced.  See Symposium, supra note 7, at 47–48. 
 168. EC Regulation, supra note 93. 
 169. Id. art. 2. 
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shop in the United States, civil law lawyers tend to sue in the place 
where the defendant is domiciled.170  Article 5(3) is an exception to the 
general rule for tort cases.171  For these cases, there can be jurisdiction in 
the place where the harmful event occurred.  This place can be the place 
where the act commenced or the place where damages were suffered.172  
In the United States, the same rule is applied according to several state 
long-arm statutes.173  However, as was earlier discussed, there is a 
required constitutional test that is not present in the EC Regulation.  
While in the European Union the defendant does not need to have any 
contact with the forum except for the damage caused, in the United 
States the defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum.  
These constitutional requirements were examined in Part III.B., 
including the outline of the three-part test developed by the Ninth 
Circuit regarding the determination of jurisdiction over nonresidents.174 
I believe that it is more reasonable to follow the U.S. approach.  
Even if the EC Regulation is representative of all civil law tradition 
rules, Article 5(3) does not reflect exactly the approaches taken by all 
the countries belonging to this tradition.175  In Mexico, for instance, 
there is no similar provision, at least in civil cases, subjecting the 
defendant to the jurisdiction of the place where the damage is 
suffered.176  Moreover, most of the Latin American codes of civil 
procedure do not have a similar provision because they are also based 
on the Mexican Federal Code of Civil Procedure.177  This is an important 
consideration to resolve because, ultimately, if it is not possible to sue a 
foreign defendant making available infringing materials through the 
Internet, then the whole purpose of the proposed mechanism would be 
useless.  Therefore, the three-part test established by the Ninth Circuit 
offers a good option for this proposal, and it represents an approximate 
midpoint for the various standards of civil law tradition countries as 
well. 
 
 170. Gardella & di Brozolo, supra note 123, at 611, 613–14. 
 171. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 5(3). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 174. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 175. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 5(3). 
 176. See generally Código Federal de Procedimientos Civiles [C.F.P.C.] [Federal Civil 
Procedure Code], as amended, art. 567, Diario de la Federación [D.O.], 31 de Agosto de 1928 
(Mex.). 
 177. See id. 
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Important challenges still remain, however.  Civil law tradition 
courts and lawyers are very formalistic.  Most of them probably would 
not feel comfortable with the expression “do some act or consummate 
some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he 
purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the 
forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections.”178  Even if civil 
law courts were comfortable with this, it is more desirable to have a 
provision defining those acts more precisely.  For instance, a definition 
could include such things as whether one has a representative in the 
forum state, whether toll-free numbers or advertisements have been 
used within the forum, whether residents of the forum are engaged as 
measured by the number of clicks to a Web site by those residents, or 
whether commercial transactions have been performed with residents of 
the forum, among others.  Therefore, it would help to have defined the 
“something more” required by the U.S. courts. 
Article 6(1) of the EC Regulation establishes jurisdiction of a court 
if one of the defendants has his or her domicile where the court is 
located “to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments.”179  This multiple 
defendant approach would be completely unacceptable under the U.S. 
Constitution; not only does the defendant not have to have any 
connection within the forum, but his actions also need not have caused 
damages in the forum.  Moreover, this kind of provision is an invitation 
to add defendants to the suit with superfluous or trivial actions only to 
choose the forum without any limit.  While these provisions are 
common in several civil law tradition countries and survive 
constitutional challenges, they are, nevertheless, starting to disappear.  
In Mexico, for example, state codes of civil procedure contain these 
provisions, but the Federal Code of Civil Procedure no longer contains 
this kind of provision.180  In order to make the negotiation process easier 
and to avoid the risk of stagnation, I recommend that similar provisions 
should be excluded from the proposal.  Such provisions are not 
necessary, and the risk of irreconcilable judgments does not justify its 
addition because that can be satisfied by the principle of res judicata. 
To illustrate this point, I will describe what I have seen in my 
practice in Mexico.  In order to sue an insurance company, the general 
rule requires filing suit in the jurisdiction of the defendant’s domicile.  
 
 178. Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995); Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. 
Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 179. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 6(1). 
 180. See C.F.P.C. [Federal Civil Procedure Code]. 
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All of the insurance companies are located in Mexico City.  In order to 
bring jurisdiction to Monterrey, which is more than a ten-hour drive 
from Mexico City, lawyers usually also sue the insurance agent.  
Obviously, they do not want to recover from an individual agent and 
they do not expect the judge to find the agent liable.  However, because 
most of the agents are locals, bringing the agent to the suit facilitates 
choosing the forum.  This is also true for cases other than insurance.  
Obviously, the insurance company has conducted activities within the 
forum that would subject it to the jurisdiction of the court under the 
U.S. standard.  However, Mexico does not have an equivalent rule and 
the only forum for all the tort actions and some contract breach actions 
is the defendant’s domicile. 
There are other points of divergence that seem to be irreconcilable.  
One of them is the U.S. basis for jurisdiction based on the presence of 
the defendant for service.  The “tag” jurisdiction is so unfamiliar to civil 
law tradition countries that it would be difficult for a civil law lawyer to 
comprehend.181  Jurisdiction based on an individual’s presence in the 
state long enough to be served would not help the proposed mechanism.  
Also, it is not necessary because consensus has been reached in the 
jurisdiction based on the place where the damages were suffered in 
addition to minimum contacts that could be accepted by negotiators of 
both legal traditions.  Trying to adopt “tag” jurisdiction as part of the 
proposed bases for an international convention on copyright litigation 
would likely add unnecessary delays and controversies to negotiations. 
As explained before, the doctrine of forum non conveniens, present 
in common law tradition countries such as the United States, is 
forbidden by the EC Regulation.182  Constitutions of countries belonging 
to the civil law tradition have been influenced by the French 
Revolution.  This influence consists largely in a distrust of the judiciary.  
Therefore, judges are confined to apply existing law to cases in an 
attempt to restrain them from acting as public policy makers.  However, 
there are no pure civil law tradition countries because of the strong 
influences of the common law tradition.  For example, even in the 
absence of a principle of stare decisis, judicial decisions become binding 
in special limited cases that are called jurisprudencia.183  Today, at least 
 
 181. See Saad Gul, Old Rules for a New World?  The Constitutional Underpinnings of 
U.S. Foreign Judgment Enforcement Doctrine, 5 APPALACHIAN J.L. 67, 92 (2006) (noting that 
tag jurisdiction is considered “exorbitant jurisdiction” in much of the world). 
 182. See supra Part III.B. 
 183. See, e.g., GUILLERMO CABANELLAS DE LAS CUEVAS & ELEANOR C. HOAGUE, 
DICCIONARIO JURÍDICO 343 (1993).  Case law is an interpretation of the law by judges, 
BARBOSA ARTICLE  
2007] INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND LITIGATION 119 
 
in Mexico, it is more common to cite a precedent in a brief or pleading 
or in legal reasoning.  Judges also exercise broad discretionary powers 
when they interpret the law.184  However, there are still strong civil law 
tradition roots in the constitutions of civil law tradition countries.  To 
illustrate this point, consider the Mexican Constitution.185  There is a 
constitutional obligation in Article 14 of the Mexican Constitution for 
judges to hear all the cases filed properly before them.186  Therefore, if 
the judge has jurisdiction according to the law, there is no room to 
dismiss the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens.  Otherwise, 
he or she would act against the Mexican Constitution.  Most civil law 
tradition countries have similar provisions.  Consequently, it is 
recommended that the proposed mechanism not include the forum non 
conveniens doctrine.187 
Other difficulties present in the Hague Draft Convention are not 
likely to be present in the enforcement mechanism.  Among those 
difficulties are the consumer protection measures or the disconnection 
clause for the European Union already discussed.  None of these are to 
be included in this proposal.  However, Article 5(5) of the EC 
Regulation does limit agents within the forum to formal branches.188  As 
discussed previously, the U.S. delegation disagreed on this point 
because it would limit the activities within the forum to formal branches.  
However, if, as has been proposed, the three-part test from the Ninth 
Circuit is included in one way or another, then a similar provision is not 
necessary for the proposed mechanism because, in this sense, the U.S. 
approach will be taken.189 
In conclusion, under the proposed convention on international 
copyright litigation, jurisdiction will be exercised only on the two 
 
whereas jurisprudencia may not include all judge-made law, but rather only those decisions 
emanating from the courts of Casación or the Supreme Court.  Id. 
 184. At least, this has been the anecdotal assessment of the author through observation 
and experience. 
 185. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). 
 186. Id. art. 14. 
 187. The doctrine of forum non conveniens has been considered inappropriate for 
international copyright litigation:  “[T]he decision compounds existing pressures on the 
already fragile international copyright system. . . . Without equally strong enforcement 
mechanisms, however ‘international copyrights’ [sic] continue to be of questionable value.”  
Lynn Carino, Note, Creative Technology, Ltd. v. Aztech System PTE, Ltd.:  The Ninth 
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Non Conveniens, 41 VILL. L. REV. 325, 363–64 (1996). 
 188. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 5(5). 
 189. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
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grounds of convergence.  The first is to adopt the approach of Article 2 
of the EC Regulation in which persons domiciled in a Member State can 
be sued in that Member State.  The second basis for jurisdiction would 
be to subject nonresidents conducting actions abroad with consequences 
in the forum. This approach would be similar to Article 5(3) of the EC 
Regulation, which establishes jurisdiction in the place where the 
harmful event occurred or in the place where the damages are 
suffered.190  However, this proposal will also include U.S. principles of 
minimum contacts as outlined in the three-part test.191  In order to adapt 
those principles to the civil law tradition, it is recommended that cases 
where such contacts were already found in U.S. cases—as measured by 
representatives in the forum state, toll-free numbers, and the number of 
clicks by residents of the forum, among others—be codified. 
3.  Preliminary Injunctions 
The issue of preliminary injunctions is probably the most difficult to 
resolve.  As previously explained, not even in the European Union is it 
possible to have injunctions issued by courts of one Member State 
enforced in courts of another Member State.192  Article 31 of the EC 
Regulation mandates that the plaintiff pursue preliminary injunctions in 
the place where they have to be enforced even if the Regulation, itself, 
mandates jurisdiction in another forum.193  Moreover, the European 
Court of Justice has established that preliminary injunctions are not 
covered by the EC Regulation because it does not cover default 
judgments granted without proper service of the procedure or without 
being summoned.194  So the enforcement of a measure without service 
and without a decision on the merits is quite controversial. 
One simple solution is to follow the European Union approach.  
This solution would include not allowing preliminary injunctions as 
decrees that can be enforced under the proposed mechanism and 
mandating plaintiffs to pursue those preliminary injunctions in the place 
where they want to stop the infringement.  If this approach is taken, a 
similar provision to Article 31 of the EC Regulation should be included.  
From several points of view, this would be the best solution.  It seems 
that it is more practical to go to a court and file a petition for a 
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preliminary injunction based on local law and remedies than to attempt 
to enforce a foreign preliminary injunction in that court.  Courts usually 
grant preliminary injunctions in copyright infringement cases.195  They 
know the national copyright law that incorporates the TRIPs 
Agreement obligations and will issue the order arguably faster than 
what would be required for a process of recognition and enforcement of 
a foreign preliminary injunction.  It would take longer to have a 
constitutional procedure or remedy against the enforcement of an 
injunction issued abroad without being served properly and without 
being defeated on the merits than to have a local preliminary injunction 
issued and enforced.  The most comprehensive international litigation 
regulation has successfully followed this approach in order to offer a 
practical solution and to avoid unnecessary problems during litigation; it 
would serve this proposal well to do likewise.196 
Moreover, as previously explained, almost all scholarly writing finds 
it problematic for an injunction issued in one country to be enforced in 
another country.197  However, the easiest way to obtain those injunctions 
remains uncertain—whether to apply for the injunction in each 
jurisdiction, as needed, or to try to enforce a foreign injunction.198  Even 
if it is problematic to have foreign preliminary injunctions enforced in a 
given court, copyright enforcement could be easier. 
Technology offers copyright infringers easy methods of circulating 
infringing materials at the same time they are protected against any kind 
of legal action by traditional constitutional and territorial principles.199  
However, in order to harmonize the situation, it is necessary to rethink 
some age-old assumptions.  Any normative justification of copyrights 
demands effective protection of works.  This does not imply revocation 
of constitutional doctrines, but rather adaptation of them to include 
assumptions about territory that have been changed by technology. 
An injunction issued in one country and enforced in another could 
be controversial due to the lack of proper service and because the 
defendant has not been defeated on the merits.200  However, this is 
exactly the same situation as local injunctions.  The difference is that 
 
 195. See supra Part III. 
 196. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 31. 
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injunctions from abroad require the recognition and enforcement of a 
foreign decree whose rules are the same for the enforcement of final 
judgments on the merits.  For instance, in the EC Regulation, the 
question was not whether it allowed the enforcement of preliminary 
injunctions but if those injunctions were covered by the Regulation.  
This is because the procedure and the rules for enforcement cover all 
types of decisions, but mostly final judgments.  Obviously, the standards 
to enforce a final decision on the merits require minimum rights for the 
defendant, such as service of process and being defeated on the merits.  
However, preliminary injunctions in copyright cases are different.  
Unlike other cases where the decision on the merits could be less clear 
at the beginning of litigation, much of copyright litigation concerns clear 
acts of infringement, and the cost of copyright infringement is nominal.  
In addition, lack of proper service and lack of a final decision on the 
merits would be justified in most copyright cases because the infringer 
has reasons to believe that his or her actions would have consequences 
abroad; this is especially true in the case, for example, of uploading 
infringing materials to the Internet where even if the alleged target of 
those communications is the local market, the Internet makes those 
materials automatically available around the globe. 
One option for the proposed convention may include a special 
procedure for preliminary injunctions, independent from the procedure 
to enforce final judgments on the merits.  These injunctions would not 
be permanent and could include a guarantee for possible damages 
caused to the defendant if he or she prevails on the merits.  For this 
procedure, there would be no requirements of previous service of 
process or a previous decision on the merits. 
Granting the preliminary injunction according to the standards of 
the country where the injunction is directed is desirable.  However, 
those standards are included in Article 50(3) of the TRIPs Agreement,201 
establishing provisional measures ordered inaudita altera parte.202  Those 
provisional measures are mandated when “any delay is likely to cause 
irreparable harm to the right holder, or where there is a demonstrable 
 
 201. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 50(3): 
[T]he applicant [is] to provide any reasonably available evidence in order to satisfy 
themselves with a sufficient degree of certainty that the applicant is the right holder 
and that the applicant’s right is being infringed or that such infringement is 
imminent, and . . . to provide a security or equivalent assurance sufficient to protect 
the defendant and to prevent abuse. 
 202. Id. art. 50(4). 
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risk of evidence being destroyed.”203  Even if the TRIPs Agreement 
establishes standards of probation in order to get a preliminary 
injunction, these may differ in each country.  However, such a standard 
of probation could not be so different because it has to incorporate the 
TRIPs Agreement obligations.  For instance, the irreparable harm test 
of the U.S. Copyright Act is presumed when the plaintiff clearly proves 
the infringement.  Generally, in most countries a preliminary injunction 
is granted when the infringement is clearly proven or when there is 
imminent harm.  Therefore, the standard of this proposal is to be 
connected with the clearness of the infringement.  If the infringement is 
clear, then harm must be presumed.  A guarantee of escrow or another 
security interest should also be included to cover possible damages 
suffered by the defendant with the injunction if he or she prevails on the 
merits.  Article 50(4) of the TRIPs Agreement establishes that 
parties affected shall be given notice, without delay after the 
execution of the measures at the latest.  A review, including the 
right to be heard, shall take place upon request of the defendant 
with a view to deciding, within a reasonable period after the 
notification of the measures, whether these measures shall be 
modified, revoked or confirmed.204 
The remaining question is to see whether the defendant would have the 
opportunity to review the decision granting the preliminary injunction.  
This could be decided by the issuing court or in the court recognizing 
and enforcing that decision.  The nature of these decisions requires 
prompt and effective procedures.  I propose that the review of these 
decisions would be made by the enforcing court, even if this may create 
contradictory decisions.  If the plaintiff does not agree with the results, 
he or she could ask the appellate court to review the defendant’s 
arguments and the decision of the enforcing court.  Then, this would be 
the final decision on the issue of the preliminary injunction. 
I propose this procedure because review by the enforcing court 
establishes the expediency necessary for the procedure.  To illustrate 
this point, let me recall the case of arbitral awards in Mexico.205  There 
are several grounds for non-recognition, and there is no appeal for the 
decision of homologation.  Although it is expedited in theory, it is not so 
in practice because of the constitutional process of amparo. 206  If the 
 
 203. Id. art. 50(2). 
 204. Id. art. 50(4). 
 205. See supra Part I. 
 206. All judicial decisions are subject to the amparo, which is a constitutional review to 
determine whether the decision is in accordance with the law—essentially it is a judicial 
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decision is to be reviewed by the issuing court, the decision may be 
enforced in Mexico, whether the case was decided in favor of the 
plaintiff or the defendant, and each enforcement procedure would be 
subject to amparo.  However, if the review is made by the enforcing 
court, the process would be simpler:  one review, one appeal, and in 
some cases one constitutional process.  Moreover, the bail guarantee 
will be less if the defendant litigates the issue of the preliminary 
injunction in his or her home court rather than abroad. 
Another option would be to hold this review in the forum of the 
issuing court.  This possibility should also be considered to avoid 
interfering with the normal procedures of the issuing court.  However, 
this option would make it more difficult for the defendant to defend his 
or her rights and more expensive to guarantee bail.  The former option 
of having the review process in the enforcing court is more like the 
European approach in which the preliminary injunction has to be 
granted by the court located in the place where the plaintiff wants to 
stop the infringement.  Because the TRIPs Agreement has somewhat 
harmonized other standards to grant those preliminary injunctions, the 
result would be more certain. 
Enforcement of the injunction is the first step of the procedure.  The 
service of process could be given at this stage by the court enforcing the 
preliminary injunction.  In the forum court, the defendant could then 
litigate all the issues, the preliminary injunction, and the merits of the 
case; however, this could be unnecessary as some jurisdictions do not 
have such formal requirements for service of process and service could 
be done by any individual. 
And so for preliminary injunctions, there are three possible 
solutions.  One is to follow the European Union approach, which has 
been tested for several years.  This approach requests that the 
preliminary injunction occur in the court of the place where the 
infringement has taken place.  The second approach is to have those 
decisions issued by the forum court and then enforced by the addressed 
court, which would review such decisions if the defendant files a petition 
for revision.  And the third possibility is similar to the second, but the 
review is done by the issuing court. 
 
assessment of constitutionality provided for under Mexico’s Constitution.  Constitución 
Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended, arts. 103, 107, Diario Oficial 
de la Federación [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). 
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4.  Applicable Law 
The issue of applicable law was examined in Part III.207  Ultimately, 
determining the applicable law is more a question of the place of 
infringement, but it should be reasonable.  According to the Berne 
Convention, the applicable law is the law of the place where the 
infringement took place.208  Nevertheless, courts should have a wide 
range of discretion to determine the place of infringement and, 
consequently, the applicable law.  However, courts should make this 
choice of law reasonable in order to avoid having their judgments 
declared against the public policy of the place where the enforcement is 
sought. 
5.  Grounds for Non-Recognition 
The idea of having grounds for non-recognition implies that the 
plaintiff has the right of recognition and enforcement unless one of the 
grounds for non-recognition is met.  The grounds for non-recognition 
are restrictive in their nature.  Nothing more than the enumerated 
grounds should be the basis for an addressing court to deny recognition 
and enforcement.  The defendant has exercised his or her defenses in 
the forum where the litigation took place, and he or she was defeated in 
the first instance and on appeal.  These grounds for non-recognition are 
not supposed to be the bases for re-litigation of the issue. 
I will enumerate the grounds for non-recognition of the U.S. 
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, the Mexican 
Federal Code of Civil Procedure, and those enumerated in the EC 
Regulation.  The grounds for non-recognition under the U.S. Uniform 
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act and the Mexican Federal 
Code of Civil Procedure are similar in that both are based on comity 
and reciprocity and are not the implementation of an international 
agreement on recognition of foreign judgments.209  In contrast, the EC 
Regulation does not need to deal with questions of reciprocity because 
there is a legal obligation for all Member States to recognize and 
enforce the judgments of other Member States.210  Consequently, the EC 
Regulation is more restrictive in its grounds for non-recognition.  It has 
 
 207. See supra Part III. 
 208. See supra note 79. 
 209. See Código Federal de Procedimientos Civiles [C.F.P.C.] [Federal Civil Procedure 
Code], 1 de Septiembre de 1932 (Mex.); UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION 
ACT, 13 U.L.A. 43 (2002). 
 210. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 31. 
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only four grounds for non-recognition while the U.S. and Mexican 
counterparts allow for additional opportunities.211 
The U.S. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws and the American Bar Association adopted the Uniform Foreign 
Money-Judgments Recognition Act in 1962.212  This uniform act is to be 
implemented by state legislatures and codifies existing common law 
principles on recognition and enforcement of certain kinds of foreign 
judgments.  As its name establishes, it covers only final judgments on 
the merits granting the recovery of a sum of money other than 
judgments for taxes, fines, other penalties, or family matters.213  It is 
applicable even if there is a pending appeal214 and has three mandatory 
grounds for non-recognition and six discretionary grounds for non-
recognition.215  If the foreign judgment does not fulfill any of these 
grounds for non-recognition, it will receive a treatment equivalent to 
sister state judgments.216  The three mandatory grounds for non-
recognition include:  (1) lack of impartial tribunal or having procedures 
incompatible to due process of law, (2) lack of personal jurisdiction,217 
and (3) lack of subject matter jurisdiction.218 
The six discretionary grounds for non-recognition are the following:  
(1) the defendant did not receive notice of the proceedings, (2) the 
judgment was obtained by fraud, (3) the judgment violates state public 
policy, (4) the judgment conflicts with another final judgment, (5) the 
proceeding was contrary to the parties’ agreement, or (6) the 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 43 (2002). 
 213. Id. § 1(2). 
 214. Id. § 2. 
 215. Id. § 4. 
 216. Id. § 7. 
 217. Lack of personal jurisdiction shall not be cause to refuse enforcement of a foreign 
judgment if: 
(1) the defendant was served personally in the foreign state; (2) the defendant 
voluntarily appeared in the proceedings . . . ; (3) the defendant prior to 
the . . . proceedings had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with 
respect to the subject matter involved; (4) the defendant was domiciled in the 
foreign state when the proceedings were instituted, or . . . had its principal place of 
business . . . incorporated . . . or had . . . corporate status, in the foreign state; (5) the 
defendant had a business office in the foreign state and the proceedings . . . involved 
a . . . [claim] arising out of business done . . . through that office in the foreign state; 
or (6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign state and 
the proceedings involved a . . . claim for relief arising out of such operation. 
Id. § 5. 
 218. Id. § 4. 
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jurisdiction was based only on personal service and the forum was 
seriously problematic for the trial.219  Several states also have another 
discretionary ground for non-recognition and require that the judgment 
come from a country granting the same reciprocal enforcement rights.220 
On the other hand, the Mexican Federal Code of Civil Procedure 
establishes the procedure in which a foreign judgment could be 
enforced.221  Article 564 establishes that the jurisdiction of the forum 
court rendering the judgment should be in accordance with compatible 
provisions of the Code, itself.222  Therefore, as already mentioned, for 
copyright infringement actions the only acceptable jurisdiction is for the 
court of the domicile of the defendant.  Article 566 establishes that 
jurisdiction agreed to by the parties before the commencement of the 
proceedings is acceptable.223  However, Article 567 establishes that such 
agreement in the forum is not going to be valid when one of the parties 
had no opportunity to negotiate the issue.224 
Article 571 establishes the grounds for recognition; there are no 
grounds for non-recognition.225  Therefore, contrary to the European or 
U.S. provisions, in Mexico there is a presumption of no enforcement 
unless the judgment complies with the grounds for recognition.  Those 
grounds are the following:  (1) the judgment has complied with the 
formalities established for foreign interrogatory letters, (2) the 
procedure does not deal with real actions, (3) jurisdiction was exercised 
according to the Mexican Federal Civil Procedure Code, (4) the 
defendant has been notified or served with process, (5) the judgment is 
res judicata in the country that rendered it, (6) the action is not subject 
to another suit still pending in Mexico or in which a definite judgment is 
rendered, (7) the judgment is not contrary to the Mexican public policy, 
and (8) the judgment fulfills the authenticity requirements.226  The same 
provision also establishes the reciprocity requirement and gives the 
judge discretion to require evidence of such reciprocity.227 
 
 219. Id. 
 220. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24.36 n.1 (3d ed. 2000). 
 221. Código Federal de Procedimientos Civiles [C.F.P.C.] [Federal Civil Procedure 
Code], Diario de la Federación [D.O.], 1 de Septiembre de 1932 (Mex.). 
 222. Id. art. 564. 
 223. Id. art. 566. 
 224. Id. art. 567. 
 225. Id. art. 571. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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The Mexican standards for recognition of a judgment are not the 
ideal standards to follow for the proposed mechanism because they 
require limited grounds for non-recognition and too few grounds and 
formalistic requirements for recognition.  The standards for recognition 
limit the exercise of jurisdiction of the foreign court to the Mexican 
approaches.  In copyright infringement cases, this indicates that if the 
infringer is domiciled in Mexico, with no assets in another place, he or 
she will be immune to the enforcement of a judgment rendered in any 
foreign court.  Therefore, this is not the path to follow for the proposed 
mechanism. 
Having enumerated the grounds for non-recognition under U.S. law 
and under Mexican law, I will next explain the grounds for non-
recognition under the EC Regulation.  Article 33 establishes that a 
“judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised in the other 
Member States without any special procedure.” 228  There are only four 
grounds for non-recognition established in Article 34.  The grounds for 
non-recognition are as follows:  (1) when the recognition is manifestly 
against public policy of the Member State in which recognition is 
sought, (2) when there are default judgments or if the defendant was not 
served properly, (3) when the judgment is already decided in the 
Member State in which recognition is sought, and (4) when the 
judgment was already decided in another Member State or in a third 
state and the earlier judgment can be enforced in the Member State in 
which recognition is sought.229 
There are fewer grounds for non-recognition because Member 
States are already bound by the same regulation covering almost all the 
possible issues that may arise during international litigation.  For the 
proposed mechanism, I will provide grounds for non-recognition based 
on the nature of the proposed mechanism and also the nature of the 
different backgrounds of the analyzed regulations.  I will take the 
grounds for non-recognition of the U.S. law and those established by the 
EC Regulation and adapt them to copyright litigation. 
The U.S. grounds for non-recognition based on impartial tribunals 
will not be included in the proposed mechanism because states signing 
the proposed mechanism will recognize that, in other Member States, 
there are impartial tribunals and also proceedings complying with due 
process requirements.  For the other two U.S. mandatory grounds for 
non-recognition, the proposed mechanism has its own allowed basis for 
 
 228. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 33. 
 229. Id. art. 34. 
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jurisdiction.  In this respect, a ground for non-recognition would be met 
if the jurisdiction was taken on a basis not provided by the enforcement 
mechanism. 
All the discretionary U.S. grounds for non-recognition contain 
almost the same grounds as in the EC Regulation, except for number 
six, which denies recognition if the jurisdiction was based on service of 
process and the forum was not convenient.230  Because jurisdiction based 
on service is not allowed under the proposed mechanism, it is not 
necessary to include such a ground for non-recognition. 
For this mechanism, judgments will be recognized and enforced 
unless they meet one of the mechanism’s grounds for non-recognition.  
The procedure of recognition and enforcement will be as simple as 
possible and the purpose of the procedure will be only to check if there 
is a ground for non-recognition.  The defendant must receive notice of 
the procedure in order to invoke one or more grounds for non-
recognition, if they exist.  Addressing courts will have discretionary 
powers to see if there is a ground for non-recognition that was not 
invoked by the defendant.  The grounds for non-recognition for the 
proposed mechanism are as follows: 
 1) If the judgment is about a litigation not covered by the 
litigation mechanism:  an infringement action; 
 2) If the judgment is based on a jurisdiction not covered by the 
proposed mechanism; 
 3) If the defendant was not served with process properly 
providing notice of the proceeding; 
 4) If the judgment was obtained by fraud; 
 5) If the judgment conflicts with another final judgment 
enforceable under the terms of the proposed mechanism in 
the addressed state; 
 6) If the proceeding is contrary to an arbitral clause between the 
parties, agreed to before the commencement of the 
proceedings; or 
 7) If such enforcement is against the public policy of the state in 
which recognition is sought. 
These grounds for non-recognition are not divided between mandatory 
and discretionary.  They all have the same weight, and it is expected that 
the judge will exercise discretion in order to comply with the proposed 
 
 230. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 43 (2002). 
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mechanism, which, if negotiations succeed, will be an international 
treaty. 
6.  Revisiting the Basic Proposed Rules 
Again, the proposed mechanism has three paths, each independent 
of the other.  What follows is a brief enumeration of the rules of the first 
and most important proposed path. 
The scope of the proposed mechanism covers all the questions 
arising from an infringement action, including succession of rights or 
ownership, if necessary.  There are two allowed bases for jurisdiction:  
(1) persons domiciled in a Member State can be sued in that Member 
State, and (2) nonresidents conducting actions with consequences in the 
forum can be sued in that forum, providing that U.S. principles of 
minimum contacts are applied.  It is additionally recommended that 
these principles be codified for the proposed mechanism. 
For preliminary injunctions there are three possible solutions.  One 
is to follow the European Union approach, consisting of the application 
of the preliminary injunction in the court where the infringement is 
taking place.  The second solution is to have the decisions issued by the 
forum court and then enforced by the addressed court, which will review 
such decisions if the defendant files a petition for review.  The third 
possibility is similar to the second, but the review would be done by the 
issuing court. 
The applicable law is the law of the place where the infringement is 
taking place.  However, courts should have wide discretion to determine 
the place of infringement and, consequently, the applicable law.  They 
have to be reasonable, otherwise the judgments could be deemed as 
contrary to the public policy of the country in which enforcement is 
sought.  And seven grounds for non-recognition will be available to be 
applied by judges with reasonable discretion. 
B.  Comity and Reciprocity 
This is the second path of the proposed mechanism.  In case there is 
a failure of negotiations with respect to the proposed convention on 
copyright litigation, as outlined in the primary proposal of this Article, 
the parties would have to litigate with the existing means of 
enforcement.231  Trying to enforce a judgment from an infringement 
 
 231. Obviously, the proposed mechanism is the best option.  Even without an 
enforcement convention, it has been suggested that enforcing foreign judgments is more cost 
effective; an enforcement convention would enhance those benefits.  See Mark D. Rosen, 
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action under the U.S. Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act or 
the Mexican Federal Code of Civil Procedure, for example, is more 
difficult than under the proposed mechanism.232  The first difference is 
that preliminary injunctions are not covered by any of those laws, but 
this is the most minimal difference.  Questions of public policy against 
the choice of law made by the rendering court and questions about the 
exercise of jurisdiction are the threshold problems.  This part of the 
Article includes an analysis of the appropriate basis for copyright 
judgments to facilitate enforcement under existing law without any new 
convention. 
Taking into consideration the impact of the TRIPs Agreement, one 
may assert that most of the infringements occurring abroad are also 
actionable under the respective foreign law.  For instance, the sale of 
pirated or counterfeit CDs in flea markets is actionable in a civil action 
under the copyright law of most of the countries belonging to the TRIPs 
Agreement.  The same can be established for sharing music over the 
Internet—an act that cannot be considered mere copying for private 
purposes, but rather is an act of unauthorized transmission to the public. 
Due to the difficulties in enforcing local judgments abroad, I suggest 
two steps in order to get those judgments enforced.  The first is the 
application of the copyright law of the place where the protection is 
sought, meaning the law of the place where the infringement is taking 
place.  The second is to avoid exercising an exorbitant jurisdiction or a 
jurisdiction not recognized or accepted by the addressed country. 
The first option, consisting of the application of the law of the place 
where the infringement takes place, is the easiest to achieve because of 
the availability of remedies among the TRIPs Agreement Member 
States.  Moreover, in most civil law tradition countries, international 
treaties like the TRIPs Agreement or the Berne Convention are self-
executing, and in cases when the international treaty establishes rights 
to be implemented by national legislatures, those implementations have 
to be in accordance with the international treaty; otherwise, the 
provisions of the treaty prevail. 
However, an important omission can cause the entire mechanism to 
fail.  None of the international copyright agreements provide for 
 
Should Un-American Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 805 (2004). 
 232. Some scholars have noted that the fact that the United States does not have a 
federal statute for enforcement of foreign judgments may cause difficulties for American 
litigants attempting to demonstrate reciprocity when trying to enforce U.S. judgments 
abroad.  See Gul, supra note 181, at 68. 
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secondary liability, namely contributory or vicarious infringement.  
Therefore, when an action is brought against an Internet service 
provider (ISP) located in a state whose laws do not provide for such 
secondary liability, the best option would probably be to consider those 
secondary acts as direct infringing activities.233  For instance, in Mexico, 
a company like Napster could not be held liable under contributory or 
vicarious infringement because there is no such legal development 
under Mexican Copyright Law.234 
In countries where there is no such legal development, general rules 
of torts established in the civil code235 can be invoked in order to hold 
persons who cause damages in common by committing a tortious act 
liable.236  This is called joint liability.  Nevertheless, there is no certainty 
in the outcome and it is more desirable to have expressly established 
secondary liability in the copyright laws or, at least, broadly recognized 
by case law. 
Under Mexican and French laws, notions of criminal complicity may 
grant a remedy for secondary liability. 237  However, not all infringement 
cases are considered crimes under both laws, and criminal offenses are 
not part of the proposed mechanism.  The proposed mechanism is 
simply an attempt to stop actual infringements abroad by using either 
civil courts or administrative agencies.  The first and the second 
proposed options are to be applied in civil courts, and the last one is for 
an administrative agency. 
The application of the copyright law of the place where the 
infringement took place may reduce the remedies available under 
domestic law.  However, it is better to have at least one remedy than to 
not have a remedy at all.  The primary goal is to stop acts of 
infringement as cheaply and simply as possible.  Certainly, it would not 
 
 233. See  J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 513 (2d ed. 2003). 
 234. For additional analysis of this point, see Roberto Garza Barbosa, Derechos de 
Autor, Derechos Conexos y Nuevas Tecnologías.  ¿Cómo Adaptar Antiguos Principios a la 
Era Digital?, 12 IUSTITIA 263, 283 (2005). 
 235. For instance, Article 1917 of the Mexican Federal Civil Procedure Code establishes 
that “[t]hose persons that jointly have caused damages, are jointly liable to the victim and are 
bound to restore according to dispositions of this chapter.”  Código Federal de 
Procedimientos Civiles [C.F.P.C.] [Federal Civil Procedure Code], art. 1917, Diario de la 
Federación [D.O.], 1 de Septiembre de 1932 (Mex.) (translated by author).  But note that 
there is no case law applying this principle to copyright law. 
 236. Under French law, for example, the liability based on Article 1382 of the French 
Civil Code establishes that a person who causes damage is bound to make repairs.  CODE 
CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1382 (Fr.). 
 237. STERLING, supra note 233. 
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be as cost effective and efficient, for example, as the ICANN Dispute 
Resolution Policy because the issue here is not dealing with domain 
names granted only by registrars subjecting all the registries to the 
ICANN Dispute Resolution Policy.238  And unlike cybersquatting in the 
domain name system, copyright infringement involves a wide range of 
activities in different mediums regulated by different copyright laws.  
However, this alternative is one option that may reduce the great 
difference between the minimum effort needed to infringe a copyright 
and the huge expense and effort to enforce rights over those infringed 
copyrights. 
The second element, consisting of the avoidance of jurisdiction, is 
more difficult because the basis for jurisdiction varies in each legal 
system, even if they are from the same legal tradition.  For instance, 
Article 5(3) of the EC Regulation establishes that jurisdiction can be 
established “in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the 
courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.”239  
However, not all civil law tradition countries have provisions similar to 
Article 5(3) of the EC Regulation.  In Mexico and some other legal 
systems of Latin America, jurisdiction can be established only in the 
defendant’s domicile and not in the place where the damages were 
suffered.  As already explained, the Mexican Federal Civil Procedure 
Code establishes that foreign judgments will be recognized if the 
exercise of jurisdiction of the issuing court is “compatible or analogous” 
with national principles, unless there is no other court with jurisdiction 
to hear the case.240  There is no case law regarding the meaning of the 
terms “compatible or analogous,” but it is very likely that such terms 
will be interpreted with similar meanings.  Therefore, foreign judgments 
and decrees will be enforced if jurisdiction is exercised under rules 
similar to those contained in the Federal Civil Procedure Code.  As a 
consequence, if the jurisdiction of foreign courts on infringement cases 
is one other than the domicile of the defendant, it is very unlikely that 
judgments and orders based on this jurisdiction will be enforced in 
Mexico. 
However, Article 565 establishes that jurisdiction not analogous or 
compatible with the statute will be recognized if the foreign court 
chooses that jurisdiction in order to avoid denegation of justice or 
 
 238. See ICANN, Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, 
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2006). 
 239. EC Regulation, supra note 93, art. 5(3). 
 240. C.F.P.C. [Federal Civil Procedure Code], arts. 554, 571-III. 
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because there was no other court to hear the case.241  But this precept 
does not establish whether such reasons have to be implicitly or 
explicitly in the judgment.  Foreign courts are not likely to explicitly 
establish exercise of jurisdiction for those explained reasons.242  
However, it can be assumed that a court always takes jurisdiction to 
hear a case because otherwise there would be a denegation of justice. 
This is one of the most difficult issues of trying to enforce a 
judgment with the existing means.  The judgment taken in one 
jurisdiction may not be recognized by the court whose enforcement is 
sought.  For all of these reasons, this path of the mechanism is the least 
likely to be useful.243  It simply reflects the actual situation and how one 
can attenuate it. 
C.  Reliance on Administrative Procedures 
There is an alternative option to stop the infringing activity.  Even 
without legal change, the mechanism of enforcement can be based on 
administrative cooperation.  In Mexico, almost all remedies for 
copyright infringement cases are issued by the Mexican Institute of the 
Industrial Property (IMPI), which is an administrative agency created 
by the Mexican Industrial Property Act.244  Article 234 of the Mexican 
Copyright Act empowers the IMPI faculties to enforce remedies for 
copyright infringements.245  Those administrative infringements are 
independent from civil actions to recover damages.  In the 
administrative procedure, there is no recovery of damages, only 
injunctions to stop the infringement.  The plaintiff may apply for an 
administrative remedy, or he or she may sue in federal or state courts in 
order to recover damages.246  Moreover, the plaintiff may apply first in 
the IMPI and then in a court that has jurisdiction.  Even if the IMPI, in 
the administrative procedure, establishes that there is no infringement, 
the copyright holder may sue in court because both actions are different:  
 
 241. Id. art. 565. 
 242. See id. 
 243. However, it has been suggested that as global trade continues to grow, there will be 
increasing need for international judicial assistance based on comity.  See Okezie 
Chukwumerije, International Judicial Assistance:  Revitalizing Section 1782, 37 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 649, 650 (2005). 
 244. Ley de la Propiedad Industrial [L.P.I.] [Industrial Property Act], as amended, art. 
6, Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 27 de Junio de 1991 (Mex.). 
 245. C.F.P.C. [Federal Civil Procedure Code], art. 234. 
 246. Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor [L.F.D.A.] [Federal Copyright Act], art. 213, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 24 de Diciembre de 1996 (Mex.). 
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one is administrative, and the other is a civil action to recover 
damages.247 
The proposed mechanism may use the administrative procedure 
taken by the IMPI.  The advantage of the use of IMPI proceedings is 
precisely IMPI’s expertise.  The Mexican judiciary is not familiar with 
copyright cases, but the IMPI is a specialized agency for those cases.248  
It can enforce remedies, like preliminary injunctions, more effectively 
than remedies available under the Federal Civil Procedure Code.  It is 
also common in developing countries to centralize enforcement of 
intellectual property procedures in an administrative agency in order to 
have more efficient remedies.  Admittedly, this can be related to several 
deficiencies in the judicial system, but this is not the issue of this 
investigation.  This is one of the reasons why Article 49 of the TRIPs 
Agreement establishes the following: 
To the extent that any civil remedy can be ordered as a result of 
administrative procedures on the merits of a case, such 
procedures shall conform to principles equivalent on substance 
to those set forth in this Section.249 
Therefore, the provisional measures directed by Article 50 to 
judicial authorities can be exercised by administrative agencies like the 
IMPI.250  Articles 203 through 212 of the Industrial Property Act give the 
IMPI a wide range of tools ranging from surveillance, to visits, to the 
forfeiture of infringing goods.251  The IMPI may order a visit to the 
premises where the infringing activities supposedly took place.252  Those 
provisions are the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement civil and 
administrative procedures and remedies.  According to Article 203 of 
the Industrial Property Act, those proceedings may be commenced by a 
petition of a copyright holder or ex officio at the initiative of the IMPI.253 
 
 247. FERNANDO SERRANO MIGALLÓN, NUEVA LEY FEDERAL DEL DERECHO DE 
AUTOR 147 (1998). 
 248. The same situation occurs in trademark infringement actions.  Litigants usually 
look first at IMPI rather than civil judicial remedies.  See Hedwig A. Lindner López, 
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Consequently, if it is not possible to enforce a preliminary injunction 
issued abroad due to an exercise of jurisdiction not recognized by the 
Federal Civil Procedure Code, then the preliminary measure may be 
enforced by the IMPI.  In this case, the procedure taken by the IMPI 
will not be a procedure of recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
judgment or decree, but rather an independent procedure started by a 
petition of the issuing foreign court.254  It is advantageous because it 
takes only a single specialized federal agency with jurisdiction to act all 
over the country.  Consequently, after receiving those foreign 
injunctions electronically, the IMPI starts an independent administrative 
procedure that will stop the infringement. 
Each country will have to establish a central office for contact that is 
going to be the channel to send and receive those preliminary 
injunctions.  The most convenient situation is for this authority to be an 
administrative agency like the IMPI, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO), or the United States Copyright Office.  In 
countries where these kinds of administrative agencies do not have the 
power to independently act on enforcement procedures, their work will 
consist of redirecting the orders to the appropriate court to hold 
enforcement proceedings according to the first path previously 
discussed.  In countries where the administrative agency has those 
powers, the most convenient measure would be to start their own 
administrative procedures in order to prevent further infringements.  If 
this is the case, special consideration must be given to the injunction of 
the foreign issuing court in order to avoid inconsistent results.  It is 
important to clarify that this possible path is going to be used more 
frequently in developing countries where most of the piracy occurs.  In 
those countries, it is common to have an administrative authority 
enforcing remedies for copyrights.  Proceedings taken by those 
administrative authorities are usually more efficient than court 
proceedings.  This is the principal reason why those administrative 
agencies have this type of enforcement authority. 
Exporting countries rely on court proceedings to enforce intellectual 
property rights instead of administrative proceedings.  Those countries 
usually have the appropriate judicial structure in order to have those 
rights enforced.  Importing countries usually have inefficiencies in their 
judicial systems and the alternative is the creation of administrative 
agencies like the IMPI.  Therefore, this third path of the proposed 
mechanism is conceived with this assumption. 
 
 254. Id. 
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If a district court in the United States grants a preliminary injunction 
against a Mexican resident in order to stop an infringement over the 
Internet through a home page hosted in a server located in Mexico, the 
proposed mechanism will work as follows.  First, a U.S. district court 
will redirect its injunctive order to the American office of contact, 
perhaps the USPTO or the Copyright Office.  Then the office of contact 
will redirect that order electronically to the designated Mexican office of 
contact, the IMPI.  In this case, the defendant is not a U.S. resident and, 
therefore, it is probable that Mexican courts would not recognize the 
grounds for jurisdiction of the U.S. court.  Thus, the way to overcome 
this difficulty would be to have an administrative proceeding started by 
the IMPI—the result being that the infringement is stopped. 
The negotiation and implementation of the third path of the 
proposed mechanism is simple.  It can be negotiated among different 
countries by an international treaty or as a mechanism of cooperation 
without an international treaty.  Developing countries using this 
mechanism have the advantage that local copyright holders do not 
have—they do not have to compete with cheaper, foreign, unprotected 
materials.  The advantage of having a less expensive way to stop 
infringement over the Internet and other technological mediums should 
encourage different countries to apply this mechanism. 
VI.  PROBABLE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECTS AND A PUBLIC CHOICE 
DEMOCRACY PERSPECTIVE 
There are several issues that have to be addressed or considered in 
the process of negotiating the enforcement mechanism.  These issues 
are related to certain consequences the mechanism will produce.  There 
are questions, not only of transnational enforcement, but also of 
probable recognition of higher copyright protection standards from one 
country to another.  As can be expected, copyright exporting countries 
like the United States have a more rigorous copyright act than countries 
that are copyright importers.  For instance, severe statutory damages, 
like those available under the U.S. law, are not present in Latin 
American countries. 
Even if this mechanism has clear rules about jurisdiction and choice 
of law, courts would probably apply their own domestic law to acts 
occurring abroad.  For example, the law of the United States—a 
copyright exporter country—would be applied to foreign defendants 
engaging in activities through the Internet.  The place of infringement 
would tend to be declared as occurring within the United States, and 
this argument, though reasonable, would ignore the choice of law rules 
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proposed in this mechanism.  If this is the case, and the rules of 
jurisdiction and choice of law of the proposed mechanism do not 
prevent the generalized application of U.S. law or the law of another 
exporting copyright country to acts occurring in another Member State, 
two problems would arise.  First, the expansion of copyright protection 
always brings benefits and costs.  The legislature of one country needs 
to balance these costs and benefits among represented players and 
voters of the legislative process, otherwise it may face the consequences 
in the next election.  However, if the cost of increasing copyright 
protection is paid by foreign non-voters, the result could be the unjust 
raising of copyright protection at the cost of foreigners who are not 
represented in the legislature.  While the harmonization provides some 
answers, differences among copyright statutes remain.  Thus, 
harmonization is not enough to solve this issue. 
The differences are principally related to the term of protection, 
statutory damages, and the availability of secondary liability under 
several jurisdictions.  There is another proposed convention on 
intellectual property litigation that was outlined by Professors Rochelle 
C. Dreyfuss and Jane C. Ginsburg (Dreyfuss & Ginsburg proposal).255  I 
bring up this proposed convention in order to explain how it deals with 
the issues discussed in this section.  While the proposed mechanism is 
not going to deal with these problems in the same way, it is illustrative 
to analyze how other proposals deal with these problems.  Unlike the 
proposed mechanism, which is designed only for copyright infringement 
litigation, the Dreyfuss & Ginsburg proposal deals with all intellectual 
property litigation, including patent and trademark litigation as well as 
other non-infringement actions.256  It is not similar to this proposed 
mechanism because it has different rules and a different background.  It 
is based on the failed Hague Draft Convention; however, it includes 
several specific provisions for intellectual property matters, and 
surprisingly, unlike the Hague Draft Convention, it provides for the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens.257  It does, however, use the same 
approach of the failed Hague Draft Convention regarding preliminary 
injunctions.258 
 
 255. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 
(2002). 
 256. See id. at 1066. 
 257. Id. at 1131. 
 258. See id. at 1132. 
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Unlike my proposed mechanism, the Dreyfuss & Ginsburg proposal 
has a specific ground for non-recognition for cases where the choice of 
law is arbitrary or unreasonable.  As already mentioned, the mechanism 
this Article proposes deals with this problem under other more general 
grounds for non-recognition applicable to judgments that are against the 
public policy of the place where recognition is sought.  As mentioned 
before, if the judgment was based on a choice of law that was 
unreasonable or arbitrary, it could be against the public policy of the 
place whose enforcement is sought. 
It is interesting, however, to note that for the Dreyfuss & Ginsburg 
proposal, a reasonable choice of law for Internet infringement cases is 
the law of the place where the operator has its residence or principal 
place of business, or if the infringing materials are not found on a Web 
site, like peer-to-peer technology, the reasonable applicable law is the 
law of the principal place of business or residence of the person that 
initiated communications.  Furthermore, in the latter case, the proposed 
convention refers to the place where peer-to-peer communication is 
initiated and not the place where the distributor of peer-to-peer 
software has its residence.  As an exception to this general rule, it also 
provides for the law of the place that has the most significant 
relationship with the controversy, for example, the law of the principal 
target of the infringing activities.  If the infringing activities target 
different countries, the laws of those different countries are going to be 
applied to the portion of infringing activities conducted in each specific 
country. 
Those specific provisions regarding choice of law and remedies seem 
to provide the proposed convention’s answer to the issues discussed in 
this section.  While they are a guide, I think that courts must decide the 
choice of law based on the place of infringement as considered by 
internal substantive legislation.  The rationale for my proposed 
mechanism consists of the acceptance of the choice of law rule 
contained in the Berne Convention:  the law of the place of 
infringement.259  Therefore, courts will decide the place of infringement 
in a reasonable way.  If courts undertake this analysis about the place of 
infringement lightly, they will threaten the enforcement of the 
judgment.  An example of a good determination of the place of 
infringement could be the place where the infringement materials were 
downloaded or uploaded by others. 
 
 259. See Berne Convention, supra note 75, art. 5(2). 
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As for the question of remedies, the Dreyfuss & Ginsburg proposal 
establishes that statutory damages are allowed, even based on statutory 
amounts rather than proof of actual damages.  The enforcing court may 
order injunctive relief, but it is limited to its territory.260 
However, I consider that all the provisions intended to deal with the 
inappropriate application of foreign copyright standards seem 
insufficient in the context of the Dreyfuss & Ginsburg proposal because 
it has exorbitant bases for jurisdiction: 
 1.  A plaintiff may bring an infringement action in the courts 
of— 
 a.  any State where defendant substantially acted (including 
preparatory acts) in furtherance of the alleged infringement, or 
 b.  any State to which the alleged infringement was 
intentionally directed, including those States for which defendant 
took no reasonable steps to avoid acting in or directing activity to 
that State, or 
 c.  any State in which the alleged infringement foreseeably 
occurred unless the defendant took reasonable steps to avoid 
acting in or directing activity to that State. 
 2.  If an action is brought in the courts of a State only on the 
basis of the intentional direction of the alleged infringement to 
that State, then those courts shall have jurisdiction only in 
respect to the injury arising out of unauthorized use occurring in 
that State, unless the injured person has his habitual residence or 
principal place of business in that State. 
 3.  If an action is brought in the courts of a State only on the 
basis of the occurrence of the infringement in that State, then 
those courts shall have jurisdiction only in respect to the injury 
arising out of unauthorized use occurring in that State.261 
As already mentioned, the mechanism this Article proposes has only 
two allowed bases for the exercise of jurisdiction:  (1) persons domiciled 
in a Member State can be sued in that Member State, and (2) 
nonresidents conducting actions with consequences in the forum can be 
sued in that forum, provided that U.S. principles of minimum contacts 
are applied.  It is recommended to have these principles codified.  
Therefore, having the U.S. requirements of minimum contact in order 
to exercise jurisdiction makes the proposed mechanism applicable to 
fewer cases than the other proposed convention.  Under the other 
 
 260. See Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 255, at 1072. 
 261. Id. at 1077. 
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proposed convention, jurisdiction may be exercised everywhere.  
Because the Internet may enable the infringement of protected works 
around the globe, the defendant under sub-section (1)(c) of the 
Dreyfuss & Ginsburg proposal is supposed to foresee that the 
infringement may occur everywhere.  If this rule were applicable today, 
all Internet Web pages would be subject to the jurisdiction of every 
court around the world, despite no other contact with the forum other 
than the Web page being available to residents of that forum. 
Admittedly, although the proposed mechanism here is less ambitious 
and more cautious than the Dreyfuss & Ginsburg proposal, it still does 
not resolve all the issues discussed in this section.  Several possible 
answers are offered to solve these problems.  During the process of 
negotiating the proposed mechanism, all of the answers can be applied. 
The first solution is related to issues of choice of law.  If the person 
who is engaged in what is considered an infringing activity in the forum 
country takes the necessary technical measures to avoid making those 
materials available in that forum, he or she would be insulated from the 
application of the law of that forum.  In other words, if a Mexican 
operator has a Web page with protected works and takes the necessary 
technical steps in order to avoid that those materials would be accessible 
in the United States, then the applicable law would be the Mexican 
Copyright Act, not that of the United States.  The distribution of those 
materials would probably not be an infringement under the Mexican 
Copyright Act.  The same rule would be applicable if the Web page 
does not contain infringing materials, but instead peer-to-peer software 
or similar devices.  Note that this is a rule of choice of law and not a rule 
related to jurisdiction because the jurisdictional bases for the proposed 
mechanism are limited to those already mentioned. 
The second answer is to either limit remedies to those available in 
the place where recognition is sought or to limit the damages to actual 
damages.  This is similar to the other proposed convention.262  Under 
this rule, the enforcing judge of a judgment containing U.S. statutory 
damages would reduce the awards to damages available in the place 
where the enforcement is sought.  This is an appealing rule; however, 
there is another alternative.  Under the U.S. Copyright Act, the 
precondition to obtaining statutory damages is to have the work 
registered in the Copyright Office prior to the infringement or, in case 
of published works, within three months of their publication.263  The 
 
 262. See id. at 1065. 
 263. 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, ch. USA § 
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recovery of those statutory damages in a third country may be 
conditioned on the registry of the work in that country.  The 
determination of whether the work is registered in the country in which 
the enforcement is sought can be made either by the forum court or by 
the court whose enforcement is sought.  This would not be in violation 
of the Berne Convention non-formality requirement because statutory 
damages are outside the scope of the Berne Convention.  For the same 
reason, in the negotiation process of the mechanism, the parties may 
determine to set those statutory damages outside the proposed 
mechanism.  Therefore, this second solution would be to reduce the 
statutory damages to those available in the country where the 
enforcement is sought, to subject those statutory damages to the 
registration of the work in that country, or to exclude statutory damages 
from the mechanism. 
The third answer is that this mechanism would have a withdrawal 
provision making it simple for affected countries to resign from the 
convention containing the proposed mechanism.  As mentioned 
previously, the legislative process of increasing copyright protection 
always has benefits and costs.  While some copyright holders may enjoy 
the benefits of the increased protection, others must pay the costs for it.  
Legislators would be cautious not to burden foreign non-voters with 
those costs because their representatives could withdraw from the 
convention. 
While any convention of this kind may cause members to relinquish 
some aspects of their sovereignty, all the members of the proposed 
mechanism would have the same obligations.  However, from a practical 
point of view, it seems that the proposed mechanism would serve only 
the interests of developed countries, and developing countries would be 
faced with surrendering sovereignty in exchange for nothing.  The 
reason for this argument is that developed countries are the major 
producers of protected works.  A net importer copyright country has no 
reason to enter into the kind of agreements that favor copyright holders 
unless it can expect something in exchange. 
If a country protects foreign works, it will obtain two favorable 
results in exchange:  the protection of its nationals’ works abroad and a 
market in which national authors and copyright holders do not have to 
compete with cheaper unprotected foreign works.  Even if this is a 
persuasive argument, it becomes less persuasive when there are 
countries that have minimal or no production of protected works, in 
 
5[3][a]. 
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contrast to other  countries that produce almost all the existing 
copyrighted materials around the globe.  Therefore, there should be 
more benefits for net importer countries, if they are to accept the 
proposed mechanism.264 
The proposed mechanism can be a tool to promote the creation of 
protected works in order to access larger markets.  There are countries 
like Mexico that produce a wide range of protected works, and this 
mechanism can serve as an incentive to enter the U.S. market where 
there are many Spanish speakers.  This could be an inducement to 
promote the creation of copyrighted works.  In fact, the Mexican 
entertainment industry is considered the major producer of television 
programs in Spanish around the globe.265  However, this is unlikely to 
occur based on experiences like the TRIPs Agreement or the Berne 
Convention, which, by themselves, not only failed to promote the 
creation of works, but failed to prevent the pervasive piracy existing in 
Mexico.266  The reasons for the great success of the Mexican producers 
are not related to copyrights but to other kinds of monopolies. 
Therefore, in order to attract net importer countries into the 
proposed mechanism, there has to be an economic incentive, even if not 
related directly to copyrights.  This incentive could broaden the internal 
markets of those developed countries that are the biggest exporters of 
 
 264. It has been suggested that the TRIPs Agreement and the WTO are “transitional 
means for creating domestic self-interest” in enforcing copyrights in developing countries.  
See Ronald J.T. Corbett, Protecting and Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights in Developing 
Countries, 35 INT’L LAW. 1083, 1103 (2001).  The author also suggests that what is needed is 
an approach that benefits domestic companies in order to produce internal pressures in local 
governments.  Id. 
 265. Grupo Televisa, S.A. de C.V. is considered the major producer of Spanish series 
and movies around the world.  This is interesting considering that Spain has a larger economy 
than Mexico.  Compare CIA, The World Factbook, Spain, https://cia.gov/cia/publications/ 
factbook/geos/sp.html#Econ (last visited Dec. 15, 2006) (stating Spain has an established 
GDP (purchasing power parity) of over $1 trillion and a GDP (official exchange rate) of over 
$1 trillion), with CIA, The World Factbook, Mexico, https://cia.gov/cia/ 
publications/factbook/geos/mx.html#Econ (last visited Dec. 15, 2006) (stating that Mexico has 
a GDP (purchasing power parity) of over  $1 trillion while it has a GDP (official exchange 
rate) of $693 billion). 
 266. See Tuan N. Samahon, TRIPs Copyright Dispute Settlement After the Transition 
and Moratorium: Nonviolation and Situation Complaints Against Developing Countries, 31 
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1051, 1054 (2000) (stating that developing countries have strong 
incentives to under-enforce copyrights).  The author also suggests that the marriage of 
international trade and intellectual property was necessary to overcome this under-
enforcement situation.  See id. at 1071–73.  I propose to use this mechanism to promote 
internal opportunities in developing countries rather than imposing measures.  Imposition has 
proven helpless. 
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copyrighted works.  However, this solution seems to force one sector of 
the exporters’ economies to pay for the advantages of another sector.  
Another alternative could be the copyright holders’ investment in those 
developing countries.  This investment may create jobs because some of 
the operations of copyright holders can be transferred to these copyright 
importing countries.  A stronger presence in those countries may create 
more awareness of how copyrights can develop the economy.267  People 
would be more sympathetic to copyright holders.  The pervasive piracy 
today results because people either do not understand the economic 
advantages of copyright law or they think it is a system of unfair 
earnings awarded to copyright holders.  A greater presence of copyright 
holders and the creation of jobs would help people in developing 
countries learn how copyrights work and would change their 
perspectives about copyrights.  The software, phonogram, and movie 
industries sometimes create unwitting development in developing 
countries.  Another alternative could be that major copyright holders 
sponsor universities in their research activities with sizeable grants or 
award scholarships in developing countries.  However, there is a risk of 
not creating economic development but only increasing copyright 
holders’ revenues: 
[B]roadening copyright generates no real economic growth, it 
increases the price . . . consumers must pay for copyrighted 
works and transfers those additional revenues to copyright 
producers.  Broadening copyright can thereby generate a real 
increase in revenue, and consequently GDP share, for the 
copyright industries even if it generates no real economic 
growth.268 
The internal process by which participant countries can withdraw 
from the enforcement mechanism could be biased by the lobbying 
power of copyright holders.  Therefore, those countries would be at risk 
of not receiving any economic advantage and still be tied to the 
proposed mechanism: 
Taken together, the advantages available to copyright owners in 
the political and legal battles over copyright’s scope do not mean 
that copyright owners will win every battle over copyright’s 
 
 267. For an economic analysis of how increasing intellectual property protection affects 
developing countries, see Evelyn Su, The Winners and the Losers:  The Agreement of Trade-
Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights and Its Effects on Developing Countries, 23 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 169 (2000). 
 268. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright:  Digital Technology, Private 
Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 899 (2001). 
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expansion.  Even with their disadvantages, consumers may on 
occasion rise up and defeat proposals for broader protection.  
Nevertheless, these advantages mean that copyright owners will 
win more such battles than they should. Whatever occasional 
defeats for broader protection occur will likely prove only 
temporary setbacks, and the disproportionate influence of 
copyright owners should prove decisive over the long run.  A 
process biased in favor of overbroad protection will lead, sooner 
or later, to a similarly biased result.  For that reason, traditional 
political avenues of opposition to copyright’s evolution from 
public interest to private interest will likely fail.  If copyright has 
not yet been fully captured by the industry it is supposed to 
regulate, it is only a matter of time.269 
Consequently, there should be strong surveillance work by the 
copyright importing countries in order to balance the economic benefits 
they will receive from the copyright holders to determine if those 
benefits are real and practicable and to not be overwhelmed by the 
powerful copyright industry of developed countries. 
In any case, in the negotiation process, developing countries may 
exclude some defendants from the mechanism, like twelve-year-old 
children or college students who engage in peer-to-peer activities.  
Otherwise, an environment of fear would lead to the rejection of the use 
of technology in developing countries.  The proposal here is to use the 
mechanism only against distributors of peer-to-peer technology.  The 
rationale for avoiding enforcing this mechanism against a few million 
users of peer-to-peer technology is based not only on practical 
reasons—because it is impossible to sue them all—but is also a question 
of social justice.  It would be unacceptable to subject an ordinary citizen 
or a child to the jurisdiction of a foreign court applying excessively 
higher standards of protection.  The mechanism is designed for ISPs or 
distributors of peer-to-peer technology engaged in infringing activities; 
however, those activities are defined by the applicable law accepted by 
the mechanism.  If these entrepreneurs are making money through their 
infringing activities or if they receive other advantages from these 
activities, then they must pay the consequences.  Nonetheless, private 
individuals engaged in such activity are probably not aware that they are 
individually causing such a great loss to the copyright owners. 
With this proposed mechanism, it is highly probable that the income 
of Mexican ISPs would decrease.  However, I do not see a problem with 
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this outcome.  According to Forbes, the major stockholder of Mexico’s 
largest ISP—Telmex—is the fourth richest man in the world.270  This is a 
shocking truth considering that almost half of the Mexican population 
lives in extreme poverty.  Other highly unregulated Mexican ISPs offer 
expensive services and low quality standards.  The proposed mechanism 
would push them into lobbying processes and public hearings, which 
could be better than how those unregulated businesses are run today. 
The last resource to deal with this problem is to trust in enforcing 
judges that are going to review if the foreign judgment is in accordance 
with their national public policy.  As mentioned earlier, if the choice of 
law was arbitrary or unreasonable, the judgment would turn against the 
public policy of the place where the enforcement is sought.  Then it 
would be unenforceable.  The key question I propose is whether the 
issuing court will properly assess the place of infringement in order to 
determine the applicable law. 
A ground for non-recognition based on public policy may be 
controversial because it could be interpreted broadly.  However, under 
the proposed mechanism, it is highly recommended that this ground for 
non-recognition would be limited to the proper choice of law and to 
public policies reflected in each constitutional text.  It should not be an 
excuse to review the foreign judgment under the eyes of national 
copyright law. 
CONCLUSION 
Copyright and neighboring rights exist because there is a public 
purpose behind them.  This public purpose is derived from the will of 
each country’s legislature to promote the creation of useful works.271  
 
 270. See Forbes.com:  Forbes World’s Richest People 2005, http://www.forbes.com/ 
static/bill2005/LIRWYDJ.html?passListId=10&passYear=2005&passListType=Person&uniq
ueId=WYDJ&datatype=Person (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).  Telmex ISP has signed up 
600,000 broadband Internet subscribers in the last year.  Id. 
 271. The most important philosophical approaches or normative justifications for 
copyright law are:  instrumentalism or utilitarianism, natural rights based principally on 
Locke, and moral rights based on Kant and Hegel.  Both utilitarian and natural rights 
justifications are present mostly in the United States and other legal systems belonging 
principally to the common law tradition.  Moral rights normative justifications are mostly 
present in civil law tradition systems.  While one justification or another may predominate in 
any particular state, other justifications remain influential.  See Justin Hughes, The 
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO L.J. 287, 288–90 (1988); Jason Lloyd, Note, Let 
There Be Justice:  A Thomistic Assessment of Utilitarianism and Libertarianism, 8 TEX. REV. 
L. & POL. 229, 255–56 (2003).  For an analysis of Locke’s natural justification for private 
property and its application to copyrights, see Benjamin G. Damstedt, Note, Limiting Locke:  
A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179, 1184–96 (2003).  
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For the purposes of this Article, it has been assumed that this is the best 
justification for copyright law.  However, the proposed mechanism is 
applicable whatever normative justification is taken. 
The territorial nature of copyrights has led to the development of 
international treaties containing national treatment principles and 
minimum standards of protection.  Those international treaties were 
written, not because there is a natural universal copyright, but because 
those conventions were useful for achieving the basic principle and 
purpose of copyright:  the promotion of new works.  By protecting 
foreign works, Member States promote the creation of new works 
because local authors do not have to compete with cheaper unprotected 
foreign works.  The harmonization through international treaties has 
done most of the work needed to establish effective copyright 
protection.  However, the most important efforts of harmonization were 
done before the digital age.  The legal development now needs to 
overcome procedural problems caused by new technology to copyright 
holders—necessitating the improvement of international litigation. 
The barrier of physical distance between countries has been broken 
with the digital age.  A mechanism is necessary that is based on 
established principles that can now be applied to the new problems 
created by technology.  Even though this proposal offers three paths, in 
case the first and most important fails, the core of the proposal is an 
international treaty for the enforcement of copyright judgments. 
 
 
 
See also Barbara Friedman, Note, From Deontology to Dialogue:  The Cultural Consequences 
of Copyright, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157, 160–67 (1994).  For an analysis of civil law 
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